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Most of existing intrusion detection techniques treat all types of attacks equally without 
any differentiation of the risk they pose to the information system. However, certain 
types of attacks are more harmful than others and their detection is critical to protection 
of the system. This study proposes a novel differentiated anomaly detection method that 
can more precisely detect intrusions of specific types of attacks. 
Although many researchers have been developed many efficient intrusion detection 
methods, fewer efforts have been made to extract effective features for host-based 
intrusion detection. In this study, we propose a new framework based on new viewpoints 
about system activities to extract host-based features, which can guide further exploration 
for new features. 
There are few feature selection methods for anomaly detections although lots of studies 
have been done for the feature selection both in classification and regression problems. 
This study proposes new support vector data description (SVDD)-based feature selection 
methods such as SVDD-R2-recursive feature elimination (RFE), SVDD-RFE and SVDD-
Gradient method. Concrete experiments with both simulated and the Defense advanced 
research projects agency (DARPA) datasets shows promising performance of the 
proposed methods.  
v
These achievements in this dissertation could significantly contribute to anomaly 
detection field. In addition, the proposed differentiated detection and SVDD-based 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the research.  Section 1.1 presents the motivation 
for the research. The contributions of the research are presented in Section 1.2.  The 
organization of the rest of this dissertation is outlined in Section 1.3. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
As Internet and computer networks play an increasingly vital role in modern society, 
intrusions into information systems have become a significant threat to our society with 
potentially severe consequences. To protect information systems from external attackers 
and disgruntled employees, effective and efficient intrusion detection techniques are 
required. As one of defense layers, intrusion detection has been widely studied and 
operated. However, there is still enough room to improve the performance of intrusion 
detection system (IDS) toward perfect detection accuracy and zero false alarm rate. Since 
a typical intrusion detection system first gathers information from a computer of interest 
and attempts to detect intrusions based on the information, more effective information 
and more accurate detection technique are required for better intrusion detection. 
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Compared to many researches on detection technique of IDS, fewer studies on host-based 
features have been carried out although features as input for IDS are as important as the 
techniques. Due to poor interest on feature development, existing host-based features are 
not diverse and are based on only system event type. Since a feature represents one 
viewpoint for user behavior in the information system, more features can help IDS 
produce more reliable and accurate results. Moreover, immensely increased computing 
power has made it significantly easier task than the before that IDS processes high-
dimensional data. Therefore, we need to explore new viewpoints about system activities 
and widen searching range for new host-based features in order to get as many effective 
features as possible. 
There exists a type of attack which causes more severe consequence than other attack 
types when it penetrates the defense layers of information system. In response, the system 
administrator wants to more strictly detect this destructive attack among other attack 
types. However, existing anomaly intrusion detection techniques do not support this task 
since they treat all attacks with equal importance. To more precisely detect intrusions of 
specific attack type, a new approach is required to perform tighter detection on the type 
and ordinary detection on the other attack type. 
Feature selection contributes cost and time reduction in obtaining and processing data by 
identifying, removing unnecessary features and selecting most predictive ones among 
whole features. There are few literatures on feature selection for the anomaly detection 
problem although feature selection has been deeply studied in the classification problem. 
The classification feature selection methods are not applicable directly to the anomaly 
3
detection and there is no feature selection method solely dedicated to anomaly detection. 
Novel feature selection methods for anomaly detection techniques are required to take 
advantages of feature selection in the field of anomaly detection.  
 
1.2 Contributions of the Dissertation 
Based on the motivations in Section 1.1, the contributions of this dissertation are as 
follows: 
1. A new approach is proposed to generate features for host-based intrusion detection 
system. The proposed approach has been applied to Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) and MIT Lincoln Lab (MITLL) 1998 BSM data set to 
extract features for anomaly intrusion detection. 
2. A new differentiated intrusion detection method is developed to more precisely detect 
more harmful attack type to information system than ordinary attacks. Mathematical 
formulation has been derived for the developed method. Based on the formulation, a 
lemma has been drawn to underpin theoretical base of the differentiated detection. 
3. Novel support vector data description(SVDD)-based feature selection methods such 
as SVDD-R2-RFE, SVDD-RFE and SVDD-Gradient are proposed to take advantages 
of feature selection in anomaly detection area. Mathematical formulations for 
criterion functions of both methods are developed in cases of kernel functions and 
executable algorithms are provided for the proposed methods. 
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1.3 Outlines of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 introduces intrusion detection systems on how to collect information and what 
detection techniques are used. Anomaly detection is presented in detail since it is related 
to this dissertation topic. In addition, recent literatures on system features and detection 
techniques are reviewed in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, the concept of new feature framework for host-based intrusion detection 
system is presented. Length, intensity, and event type related features are described under 
the proposed framework. The process of feature extraction from the DARPA 98 BSM 
dataset is also presented. Furthermore, the results of the experiment of new features from 
the DARPA are discussed. 
A differentiated intrusion detection methodology is presented in Chapter 4. Introduction 
to SVDD, formulation for differentiated intrusion detection, and differentiated anomaly 
intrusion detection are also presented. The performance of the proposed method was 
examined with simulated data and the DARPA data. The results on the experiment are 
discussed. 
Chapter 5 presents the motivation of SVDD-based feature selection and introduction to 
feature selection for anomaly detection. Formulations and algorithms for SVDD-R2-RFE, 
5
SVDD-RFE and SVDD-Gradient feature selection methods are also presented. 
Experiments with the proposed methods and their results are discussed. 
In Chapter 6, finally, conclusions and future research are presented. 
6
Chapter 2 Intrusion Detection System 
 
This chapter provides literature reviews for intrusion detection system. Section 2.1 
presents a background for intrusion detection system. General introduction to intrusion 
detection system is described in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents the summary of recent 
research for intrusion detection system. 
 
2.1 Background 
We now live in the information age. It is nearly impossible to imagine our lives without 
the Internet and information systems. We increasingly rely on information systems in 
banking, stock trading, telecommunication, broadcasting, transportation, and many other 
systems which are operated on the computer networks. While the possibilities and 
opportunities afforded by computer information systems are steadily expanding, the risk 
of malicious intrusions such as computer viruses or the theft of data, also, is growing. 
Damage of information systems due to system attacks has been increasing. In 2002, 
companies lost roughly $20 billion to $30 billion from the virus attacks according to a 
ZDNet Security News Article dated January 2004. This figure went up from about $13 
7
billion in 2001. In response for these destructive system attacks, financial services 
companies are spending about 6% of their IT budgets for security of their information 
system according to global security survey (Tohmatsu, 2003). Intrusions into information 
systems have become a significant threat to our society with potentially severe 
consequences. 
An intrusion into an information system is defined as compromising its security such as 
availability, integrity and confidentiality through a series of events in the information 
system (Ye & Chen, 2001). In its broadest definition, a computer attack is any malicious 
activity directed at a computer system or the services it provides (Kendall, 1999). There 
are several types of intrusions as follows (Kendall, 1999): 
o viruses, 
o use of a system by an unauthorized individual, 
o denial-of-service by exploitation of a bug or abuse of a feature, 
o probing of a system to gather information, or 
o a physical attack against computer hardware. 
Also, there are categories for attack techniques as in table 2.1. For example of social 
engineering, an attacker can call an individual on the telephone impersonating a 
network administrator in an attempt to convince the individual to reveal confidential 
information including passwords, file names and details about security policies. Specific 
examples of implementation bugs are buffer overflows, race conditions, and mishandled 
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Gaining access to a system by fooling an authorized user into 
providing information that can be used to break into a system.   
Implementation 
bug 
Bugs in trusted programs can be exploited by an attacker to gain 
unauthorized access to a computer system.   
Abuse of feature Legitimate actions that one can perform that when taken to the extreme can lead to system failure. 
System 
misconfiguration
An attacker can gain access because of an error in the configuration of 
a system. 
Masquerading In some cases it is possible to fool a system into giving access by misrepresenting oneself.   
temporary files. Examples for abuse of feature include opening hundreds of telnet 
connections to a machine to fill its process table, or filling up a mail spool with junk e-
mail. An example of system misconfiguration is that the default configuration of some 
systems includes a “guest” account that is not protected with a password. Masquerading 
example is sending a TCP packet that has a forged source address that makes the packet 
appear to come from a trusted host. 
Defense measures are required to protect computers and networks from unauthorized use 
or malicious attack. Layered defense measures are generally used to reduce the 
possibility of intrusions as possible. Prevention is the first measure to be used. They are 
firewalls and guards, authentication, and encryption. The second measure is intrusion 
detection to identify intrusions being leaked through the fence of prevention. The last one 
is reaction to minimize damage due to intrusions penetrating the defense layers. Among 
9
those defense measures intrusion detection has been attracting more attention as backup 
of not-robust prevention. Moreover it is said that intrusion detection has become an 
indispensable defense line in the information security infrastructure (Li et al., 2005). 
 
2.2 General Introduction to Intrusion Detection System 
Generally an intrusion detection system (IDS) detects a possible intrusion and notifies a 
system administrator of its presence (Kendall, 1999) as shown figure 2.1. An IDS 
consists of two functioning parts, information collection and decision. Information 
collection part is to gather data from a computer or network of computers of interest. It is 
important for this part to get more representative features well describing user’s activities. 
Decision part is to attempt to detect an intrusion based on the obtained information. Main 
interest in this part is to develop more effective decision rule to reduce decision errors. 
Key elements for good IDS are to acquire representative features and to apply effective 
detection technique. 
2.2.1 Information collection  
There are two questions to be answered in order to find more representative features: 
o What observable subjects should be selected for monitoring and analyzing user’s 
behavior? 
o What attributes should be considered for characterizing these related subjects? 
10
Although there are many observable subjects, most intrusion detection systems in 
existence today use one or more of these three types of data such as sniffed network 
traffic, host-level audit files, and file-system state. The first subject is traffic sent over the 
network. All data that is transmitted over an Ethernet network is visible to any machine 
that is present on the local network segment. Because this data is visible to every machine 
on the network, one machine connected to this Ethernet can be used to monitor traffic for 
all the hosts on the network. Network traffic can be sniffed using a single machine 
running the tcpdump program to save the network traffic. The second object for an 
intrusion detection system is host-level audit data.  Most operating systems offer some 
level of auditing of operating system events. An example is Basic Security Module 
(BSM) data from a Solaris operating system. The third object is information about file 
system state. Daily file system dumps is collected from each machine. An intrusion 
detection system that examines this file system data can alert an administrator whenever a 
system binary file such as the ps, login, or ls program is modified. Normal users have no 
legitimate reason to alter these files, so a change to a system binary file indicates that the 
system has been compromised. Usually network traffic data and host-level audit data are 
frequently used in IDS. Therefore an IDS is categorized into host IDS or network IDS by 
where its data is collected. 
Attributes are data or a group of data describing observable subjects. Attributes for host-
level audit data are command line strings, system call traces, and resource consumption 
patterns while attributes for network traffic data are intrinsic features, traffic features, and  
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content features. Information collection is performed by making data or features from 
those attributes. Many researched are still seeking more practical and effective attributes. 
2.2.2 Detection techniques  
Various detection techniques have been applied into IDS. Those detection techniques are 
in figure 2.2. Signature recognition techniques can find known types of attack while 
bottleneck verification, specification-based detection and anomaly detection techniques 
can find new types of intrusion. Anomaly detection technique requires more computation 
efforts and memories since it is the most sophisticated among detection techniques. 
 
Figure 2.2 Detection Techniques for intrusion detection 


















Bottleneck verification technique detects illegal transitions between two groups of states. 
However, this technique applies to only situations where there are only a few well 
defined ways to transition between two groups of states. One example of such a well-
defined transition is transitions from a normal user to super-user within a shell. If an 
individual is in the user state, the only way to legally gain root privileges is by using the 
su command and entering the root password. Thus, if a bottleneck verification system can 
detect a shell being launched, determine the permissions of the new shell, and detect the 
successful use of the su command to gain root access, then illegal transitions from normal 
user to root user can be detected (Kendall, 1999).  
Specification-based detection technique detects behavior that violates the security 
specifications. Before monitoring user’s activities, this approach requires written security 
specifications that describe the normal behavior of programs. Then host-based audit 
records are then monitored to detect behavior that violates the security specifications. 
However, there is a limitation to apply because writing security specifications for all 
monitored program which are constantly updated. 
Signature recognition and anomaly detection techniques are popular since bottleneck 
verification specification-based detection techniques are applied only to specific cases. 
Currently existing intrusion detection techniques fall in two major categories: signature 
recognition and anomaly detection. Signature recognition technique looks for an invariant 
sequence of events that match a known type of attack. There are three steps: collection 
the signatures of known intrusion scenarios, matching the observed behavior with these 
intrusion signatures, and notifying signal an intrusion when there is a match (Ye & Chen, 
14
2001). An example of signature recognition technique is network security monitor (NSM), 
an early signature-based intrusion detection system that find attacks by searching for 
keywords in network traffic captured using a sniffer (Lippmann et al., 2000; Anderson et 
al., 1995). The advantage of signature recognition technique is that the computation 
required to reconstruct network sessions and search for keywords is not excessive. 
However, the limitation is that it cannot detect novel attacks whose signatures are 
unknown. The limitation of signature recognition techniques can be overcome by using 
anomaly detection techniques as a complement (Ye & Chen, 2001). 
Anomaly detection technique is one of the most frequently suggested approaches to 
detect novel new attacks. Basic idea is that intrusive behavior often shows anomalies 
from normal behavior in an information system and anomalies can be used to detect 
possible intrusions (Ye & Chen, 2001). It first establishes a statistical model of the 
subject's normal behavior and then issue warnings when it observes actions that deviate 
significantly from those models. Examples of anomaly detection technique are NIDES 
and EMERALD. NIDES is one of the first statistical-based anomaly detection systems 
used to detect unusual user and unusual program behavior. It forms a model of a user, 
system, or network activity (Kendall, 1999). EMERALD combines statistical anomaly 
detection from NIDES with signature recognition (Kendall, 1999). Anomaly detection 
technique has advantage to detect both known and novel intrusions if they demonstrate 
departures from a norm profile. Also there are disadvantages for anomaly detection such 
as careful tuning and large computation. Since anomalous behavior does not always mean 
an intrusion, anomaly detection systems need to be carefully tuned to avoid high false 
15
alarm rates. A second disadvantage of anomaly detection schemes is the large 
computation and memory resources required to maintain the statistical model (Kendall, 
1999).    
2.2.3 Kinds of anomaly intrusion detection techniques  
Existing anomaly detection techniques are strings, formal logic, production rules and 
statistical-based, stochastic, and data mining as seen in table 2.2.  
In strings approach, a set of detector strings is constructed for a set of normal strings so 
that detector strings do not match self strings. If an incoming string matches any of the 
detector strings for at least the r number of contiguous bits, the detection of an anomaly is 
declared (Forrest et al., 1997). However, strings approach become infeasible when there 
exist normal strings for which it is impossible to generate detector strings.  
Table 2.2 Various kinds of anomaly intrusion detection techniques 
Strings 
Formal logic 












Nearest neighbor clustering 
Logistic regression 
Data mining 
Neural network model Self-Organizing Map (SOM) 
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The logic-based anomaly detection technique has been applied to routers, Domain Name 
System and some privileged programs. However, formal logic is difficult for most system 
administrators to understand and use for specifying a norm profile (Ko et al., 1997). In 
contrast, production rules in expert systems are more natural and understandable than 
formal logic for most system administrators to specify and update a norm profile 
(Anderson et al., 1995). However, it is difficult to enumerate and specify all possibilities 
of normal behavior, especially when multiple subjects are involved. Moreover, the 
behavior of a subject such as a user is generally not fixed but dynamically changing. The 
limitation in using formal logic or production rules is the difficulty to specify the 
dynamically changing behavior in advance (Ye & Chen, 2001). 
Statistical-based anomaly detection approach represents well the expected normal 
behavior of a user and variance due to noises, thereby overcomes the problems with the 
string-based, logic-based and rule-based technique (Jou et al., 2000). However, there is a 
limitation that the computationally intensive procedure of the multivariate techniques 
cannot meet the demands - minimum delay of processing. Many researchers have tried to 
find a multivariate technique with a low computation cost. 
As more advanced statistical tools, data mining techniques are able to deal with huge 
data. They can satisfy the demands for modern intrusion detection technique that should 
deal with large volumes of high-dimensional process data due to a large number of 
behavior measures and process rapidly to ensure an early indication and warning of 
intrusions. Also there is limitation that improper parameter selection might cause the 
over-fitting problem. 
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2.3 Recent Researches 
In recent years, there have been a lot of researches on intrusion detection system (IDS) 
which differentiates an intrusive behavior from ordinary activities on the information 
systems. Those researches have focused on what attributes and data are most suitable for 
the user behavior and what technique is most effective in detecting suspicious activities. 
There has been a ground presumption related to data acquisition that normalcy and 
anomaly of a system be accurately manifested in selected system features (Lee & Stolfo, 
1998).  
2.3.1 System features  
System features or data are collected at a host computer or network linking hosts. 
According to data source location, IDS are categorized into host-based and network-
based IDS’s. Host-based IDS detects an intrusion on the system by monitoring activities 
of only host computer. Various features such as sequence of system events (Forrest et al., 
1996; Lee et al., 1997), event sequential order (Ye et al., 2002), the number of system 
events (Li & Ye, 2002; Ye et al., 2003) and frequency of each system events (Oh & Lee 
2003; Zhang & Shen 2005) have been used for host-based IDS’s.  
Ye and Chen (2001) used intensity of each event for host-based anomaly detection. Audit 
data was obtained from a UNIX-based host machine, specifically a Sun SPARC 10 
workstation with the Solaris operating system. Since there were about 284 different types 
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of BSM audit events on the host machine, 284 event types were considered in this study. 
Intensity of each event was measured from event type with occurring time as follows: 
)1()1(1)( −×−+×= tXtX ii λλ (2.1) 
when the audit event at time t falls into the ith event type and  
)1()1(0)( −×−+×= tXtX ii λλ (2.2) 
when the audit event at time t is different from the ith event type where )(tX i is the 
observed value of the ith variable in the vector of observation at time t, λ is a smoothing 
constant that determines k or the decay rate.  
Chen et al. (2005) introduced tf (term frequency) × idf (inverse document frequency) 
scheme, a common method in text categorization, based on frequency of system events. 
Each system call was treated as a “word” in a document and the set of system calls 
generated by a process was treated as the “document”. This analogy made it possible to 
bring the full spectrum of well-developed text processing methods to apply to the 
intrusion detection problem. In order to apply text categorization, each process was first 
represented as a vector where each entry represents the occurrence of a specific system 
call during the process execution. Frequency-based encoding method was used to 
characterize program behavior. It requires to aggregate system call information over the 
entire execution of a process.  Frequency-based encoding technique reduces the system 
overhead compared to sequence-based encoding techniques which require building a 
profile for each program and checking for attacks at every time frame. Since Frequency-
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based encoding techniques build a profile only for each process and not for each program 
and check for attack instances at the end of the process.  
Network-based IDS monitors traffic data traveling on the communication links and uses 
connection information among hosts as system features. Depren et al. (2005) used only 
six basic features of TCP/IP data while Wang (2005) used 46 variables. Wang (2005) 
reduced the number of independent variables by identifying the risk factors associated 
with individual major attacks. Most previous studies used all possible independent 
variables. Statistically, a model with a large number of independent variables does not 
necessarily have high predictive ability. Unnecessary variables can create bias and lead 
the model either to overestimate or underestimate predicting values but information about 
an individual risk factor associated with the attacks remains unclear. 46 risk factors, that 
is independent variables, with all features summarizing each connection information were 
used. Wu and Zhang (2006) used association rules to get more representative data from 
TCP/IP data. As more and more useful system features as possible are available for IDS, 
the classifier based on the features would be more effective.  
2.3.2 Detection techniques  
Detection techniques are broadly categorized into misuse detection (signature 
recognition) and anomaly detection according to their ideas on detecting intrusions. 
Misuse detection techniques signal an intrusion when an observed behavior matches a 
known attack. Anomaly detection techniques regard anomalies from normal behavior as 
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intrusions. Generally anomaly detection performs better to detect new attacks than misuse 
detection techniques.  
Various detection techniques have been applied into IDS. Ye and Chen (2001) applied a 
multivariate anomaly detection technique based on the chi-square statistics. Many 
intrusions involve multiple subjects and multiple actions having impact on multiple 
behavior measures. Hence, a multivariate anomaly detection technique is needed for 
intrusion detection. However, the computationally intensive procedure of multivariate 
techniques cannot meet the demands of intrusion detection that can process large volumes 
of high-dimensional data within a short processing time. They selected chi-square as a 
statistics for multivariate anomaly detection technique since it has a low computation cost. 
Also, specification-based detection (Sekar et al., 2002), stochastic model (Ye et al., 2002) 
and factor analysis (Wu & Zhang, 2006) have been used as anomaly detection techniques. 
Data mining techniques have become popular in intrusion detection research field since 
Lee and Stolfo (1998) proposed using data mining techniques for IDS. Data mining can 
relatively easily extract structural information and insights from huge datasets. Such an 
advantage of data mining techniques is also very useful to IDS. Li and Ye (2002), Oh and 
Lee (2003), Liu et al. (2004), and Li and Ye (2006) developed clustering methods based 
intrusion detection systems.  
Jiang et al. (2006) proposed a clustering-based method for unsupervised intrusion 
detection (CBUID) to overcome shortages in the all existing unsupervised methods. 
Existing unsupervised methods cannot deal with categorical attributes or their solutions 
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are very complicated, the result of detection is sensitive to the parameters which are 
difficult to be determined and it is not reasonable to assume that the smaller size clusters 
of objects have, the more possible they are anomalous. In CBUID the data classification 
is performed by an improved nearest neighbor method and its time complexity is linear 
with the size of dataset and the number of attributes. 
While Wang (2005) applied multinomial logistic regression modeling approach for 
anomaly intrusion detection. Previous studies focused on a signal binary outcome, that is, 
normal or abnormal, to detect potential attacks. This multinomial logistic regression can 
identify multi-type attacks as an outcome. Zhang and Shen (2005) presented the use of 
support vector machine (SVM) for IDS. SVM is a new technique for solving a variety of 
learning, classification and prediction problems. It is originated as an implementation of 
Vapnik’s structural risk minimization (SRM) principle, which minimizes the 
generalization error, i.e., true error on unseen examples. One remarkable property of 
SVM is being independent of the feature space dimensionality. This means that SVM can 
generalize well in the presence of many features. Chen et al. (2005) proposed application 
of SVM and artificial neural network (ANN) for intrusion detection. ANN is a 
biologically inspired form of distributed computation. It is composed of simple 
processing units, or nodes, and connections between them. The connection has some 
weight, which is used to determine how much one unit will affect the other. The result 
has shown that the SVM performance is better than that for the ANN. 
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Chapter 3 New Framework for Host-based 
Feature Extraction 
 
This chapter provides new framework for host-based feature extraction. Section 3.1 
explains concept of new feature framework. New features developed under the proposed 
framework are discussed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the process of feature 
extraction from the DARPA 98 BSM dataset. Finally, experiment with the new features 
and the results are presented in Section 3.4.  
 
3.1 New Framework Concept 
Host-based IDS requires information for users’ activities to detect an intrusion into a 
system of interest. The required information is data representing system users’ activities 
and data is a collection of values for features or variables which are defined by specific 
descriptions or equations with output values from system monitoring. For example, 
session length can be a feature defined as session duration time measured in seconds. 
Since a feature represents a kind of sight of system administrator for users’ behavior, 
diverse features mean layered and different points of view for an activity in the system.  
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* @&+%#$0: example symbols representing system event types 
 
Therefore, more features guarantee more reliable performance of IDS. Researchers have 
tried to develop more useful system features as possible for more effective results of IDS. 
Two kinds of general view point for an abject are exterior and interior. Exterior view 
point concerns the shape or size while interior view examines the contents in an object 
and inside shape. Applying this concept into IDS feature development, session dimension 
features come from exterior view whereas session structure and content features come 
from interior view point as in figure 3.1. In the figure a session has three processes with 
four, eight, and two system events, respectively. 















Session dimension features relate with size of a session which means session length and 
the length of its processes. For instance, it is about how long a session last in terms of 
time or the number of system events. Session structure features measure what the session 
looks like, for example, how many processes the session has and how the processes relate 
with one another. Session content features identify the event types while session 
dimension features do not distinguish the event types of a session. The content features 
deal with the occurrence of a specific event type and how many kinds of events appear on 
a session.  
Various features have been used for Host-based IDS. They are sequence of system events 
(Forrest et al., 1996; Lee et al., 1997; Ye et al., 2002), the number of system events (Li & 
Ye, 2002; Ye et al., 2003) and frequency of each system events (Ye & Chen, 2001; Oh & 
Lee, 2003; Zhang & Shen, 2005). Chen et al. (2005) introduced tf(term frequency) × idf 
(inverse document frequency) scheme, a common method in text categorization, based on 
frequency of system events. Existing features can be categorized into three categories 
based on the concept as seen table 3.1. Frequency of each system events and tf × idf 
scheme are a form mixed with session structure and content features. However, there is 
no literature for using session dimension features and all the features from three feature 
categories. To get as many features as possible, we need to more thoroughly explore 
features in the three points of view such as session dimension, structure and content. 
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Table 3.1 Categorizing existing features 
 
Categories Literatures 
Session dimension - 
Session structure 
Forrest et al. (1996)*, Lee et al. (1997)*, Ye & Chen (2001)*  
Li & Ye (2002)*, Ye et al. (2002)*, Ye et al. (2003)* 
Chen et al. (2005)*, Zhang & Shen (2005)* 
Session content 
Forrest et al. (1996)*, Lee et al. (1997)*, Ye & Chen (2001)*  
Li & Ye (2002)*, Ye et al. (2002)*, Ye et al. (2003)* 
Oh & Lee (2003), Chen et al. (2005)*, Zhang & Shen (2005)* 
* Features combined with session structure and content 
3.2 New Feature Development under the Framework 
Three kinds of view for a session can be well described as more practical terms. Since 
session dimension is measured by length of a session, length features are for session 
dimension. Session structure concerns mainly its intensity and intensity features 
represents session structure. As session consists of system events, event features mean 
session content related features. Length and intensity features ignore system event type 
and just count the number of events while event features distinguish a type of event with 
other event types. 
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3.2.1 Length-related features 
Statistics related to length are based on session length and process length. There are three 
subgroups for length-related features such as overall length features, features by process 
duration time, features by number of events in processes. The length of a session is 
measured by duration time in seconds, the number of system event occurrences and the 
number of processes in the session. Also, the length of a process is measured by duration 
time in seconds and the number of system event occurrences in the process. First, last, 
longest, shortest process in a session are considered to have important information for 
user’s behavior. Average values and ratios among features are introduced to carry 
potential information. Table 3.2 shows all possible features related to length and their 
range of values. Five features came from overall length feature subgroup, twelve features 
from feature subgroup by process duration time and twelve features from feature 
subgroup by number of events in processes. There are 29 features related to length in 
total. 
3.2.2 Intensity-related features 
Intensity of a session can be understood by three points of view such as overall intensity, 
process level and system event level. Overall intensity is calculated by average number of 
processes and system events over system length time which gives information for how 
many processes and system events occurs per second. The intensity of process level is 
about how many processes intersect at a given time period and how long they intersect  
27
Table 3.2 Length-related features 
 
Subgroup Description Name Range 
Session duration time in seconds “Dur” value≥0
Logarithm Dur “lnDur” value≥0
Number of events  “NumEv” value>0 
Logarithm NumEv  “ln NumEv” value≥0
Overall 
length 
Number of processes “NumPr” value≥1
Average of all processes’ duration time in 
seconds 
“avDurPr” value≥0
Longest duration time among all processes “longDurPr” value≥0
Shortest duration time among all processes “shoDurPr” value≥0
First process’s duration  “DurFirPr” value≥0


























Table 3.2 Continued 
Subgroup Description Name Range 
Average of all processes’ number of events “av#EvPr” value>0 
Largest number of events among all 
processes 
“larg#EvPr” value>0 
Smallest number of events among all 
processes 
“smal#EvPr” value>0 
First process’s number of events “FirPr#Ev” value>0 






























“F/L_#Ev Pr%” value>0 
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together. Figure 3.2 shows how to measure process level intensity based on the process 
intersection. Session B has higher intensity of process level than session A although both 
of sessions have three processes in the figure. 46 Various features related to process level 
intensity are developed from intersection, based on the number of intersecting, 
intersecting time, the number of processes related to an intersection and the number of 
intersections related to a process. 
 
















Session B: Three  
occurrence points 










Figure 3.2 Example for process level intensity based on the intersection 
Figure 3.3 Example for system event level intensity in a session 
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The intensity of system event level is based on how many event occurrence points are in 
a session. Event occurrence point is the time when a system event or system events 
appear. Given same number of system events and same session duration time, the number 
of event occurrence points can be different. In figure 3.3, session A has seven occurrence 
points and session B has only three occurrence points even though both sessions have 
seven system events with ten second duration time. Session A is denser than session B in 
terms of occurrence points while session B shows more number of system events per a 
occurrence point than session A. 16 features based on the occurrence points are 
developed. Table 3.3 shows 64 features related to intensity. 
 
3.2.3 Event-related features 
Features related to event types are created by using the number of event types which 
depends on the operating systems. Event-related features come from two subgroups such 
as event diversity and event frequency. Event diversity is about how many diverse events 
happen in a session. Event frequency is measured for each event type as how many times 
a specific event appears in a session. Table 3.4 shows event-related features. 
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Table 3.3 Intensity-related features 
Subgroup Description Name Range 
Average number of events per second “AvgNumEv” Value>0 Overall 













Maximum time of Intersection “MaxIntT” value≥0
Minimum time of Intersection “MinIntT” value≥0
Average time of Intersection “AvgIntT” value≥0
Summation of all Intersection duration times “SumIntT” value≥0
ationTimeSessionDur





























Table 3.3 Continued 
 






duration onIntersecti all ofSum  “SumIntT/Time” value≥0
processesof








onIntersectiany  ininvolved processes of#
__#
“IntPro/Pro” value≥0
Maximum number of processes involved in an Intersection “Max#ProInt” value≥0
Minimum number of processes involved in an Intersection “Min#ProInt” value≥0
Average number of processes involved in an Intersection “Avg#ProInt” value≥0
ationTimeSessionDur
onIntersecti anininvolved processes of#Max.  
“Max#ProInt/Time” value≥0
processesof








onIntersecti anininvolved processes of#Min.  
“Min#ProInt/Time” value≥0
processesof








onIntersecti anininvolved processes of#Avg.  “Avg#ProInt/Time” value≥0
processesof











Table 3.3 Continued 
 
Subgroup Description Name Range 
Maximum number of intersections involved in a process “Max#IntPro” value≥0
Minimum number of intersections involved in a process “Min#IntPro” value≥0
Average number of intersections involved in a process “Avg#IntPro” value≥0
ationTimeSessionDur


































































Maximum Number of events in a Occurring point of a session “MaxEvPts” value≥1





Average Number of events of Occurring points in a session “AvgEvPts” value≥1
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Table 3.3 Continued 
 
Subgroup Description Name Range 
TimeDurationSession














































Table 3.4 Event-related features 
 
Subgroup Description Name Range 
Number of event types occurred in a session “#typeEv” value≥1
ationTimeSessionDur




a Session inoccurred types event of#
_____#
“#typeEv/Ev” value>0 
Number of occurrences of event i “NumEv(i)” value≥0Event 
frequency 
SessionainEventsof
ievent ofsoccurrence ofNumber 
_____#
“NumEv(i)%” value≥0
3.3 Feature Extraction from the DARPA 98 BSM Data 
3.3.1 Data source 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) wished to evaluate 
competing algorithms and systems for computer intrusion detection. MIT Lincoln Lab 
(MITLL) built a simulation network at an Air Force base which consisted of models for 
different types of users including secretaries and managers and known attacks or their 
variants such as DOS, R2L, U2R and PROBE. Figure 3.4 shows the simulation network 
comprising about 100 users and 1000 host computers. 
Simulated traffic of an air force local area network was collected into two types of files; 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) dump data file and Basic Security Module (BSM) 
data file as seen in figure 3.5. TCP dump data files record information for traffic sent 
over the network by sniffing the network at a machine connected to it. BSM data files 
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record system events made in a victim machine for host-level audit. This simulation had 
been performed for two years beginning in 1998.  
There are two data sets as the result of this DARPA intrusion detection evaluation 
project; 1998 and 1999 data sets. The 1998 data set consists of seven-week training data 
and two-week testing data. The 1999 set contains three-week training data and two-week 
test data. Those data sets have been widely used to evaluate many intrusion detection 
systems newly proposed in the literatures. We used host-based BSM audit data from the 
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3.3.2 Data preprocessing 
BSM records security-relevant events to monitor activities in a host machine. Two files 
are given by BSM; BSM list file and BSM audit data file. BSM list files show 
information for sessions comprising one or more system events of all hosts in the network 
whereas BSM audit files provide information for only system events of a specific host. 
Since a session is a set of system events, BSM list file is a brief summary of activity in 
the network and BSM audit file is a large raw-data file recording the details of activity in 






































Figure 3.5 Data acquisition and simulation network detail 
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Table 3.5 List and size of the DARPA 98 BSM list files and audit files 
Date BSM audit file & size BSM list file & size 
Monday bsm.audit    174,618KB bsm.list  26KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit   180,142KB bsm.list  23KB 
Wednesday bsm.audit    256,927KB bsm.list  59KB 
Thursday bsm.audit    179,754KB bsm.list  42KB 
First week 
Friday bsm.audit    193,231KB bsm.list  33KB 
Monday pascal.praudit   154,870KB bsmout.list  28KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit   139,984KB bsmout.list  28KB 
Wednesday pascal.praudit   187,613KB bsmout.list  32KB 
Thursday pascal.praudit   182,420KB bsmout.list  29KB 
Second 
week 
Friday pascal.praudit   213,860KB bsmout.list  32KB 
Monday pascal.praudit.gz 552,565KB bsm.list.gz  46KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit.gz 257,125KB bsm.list.gz  40KB 
Wednesday pascal.praudit.gz 642,188KB bsm.list.gz  38KB 
Thursday pascal.praudit.gz 400,464KB bsm.list.gz  40KB 
Third 
week 
Friday pascal.praudit.gz 212,560KB bsm.list.gz  31KB 
Monday pascal.praudit.gz 221,202KB bsm.list.gz  36KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit.gz 305,277KB bsm.list.gz  54KB 
Wednesday pascal.praudit.gz 177,834KB bsm.list.gz  24KB 
Thursday pascal.praudit.gz 208,413KB bsm.list.gz  47KB 
Fourth 
week 
Friday pascal.praudit.gz 528,592KB bsm.list.gz  33KB 
Monday pascal.praudit.gz 447,703KB bsm.list.gz  43KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit.gz 255,600KB bsm.list.gz  47KB 
Wednesday pascal.praudit.gz 195,566KB bsm.list.gz  41KB 
Thursday pascal.praudit.gz 439,921KB bsm.list.gz  49KB 
Fifth week 
Friday pascal.praudit.gz 205,868KB bsm.list.gz  44KB 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
Date BSM audit file & size BSM list file & size 
Monday pascal.praudit.gz 418,010KB bsm.list.gz  35KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit.gz 257,561KB bsm.list.gz  39KB 
Wednesday pascal.praudit.gz 197,389KB bsm.list.gz  34KB 
Thursday pascal.praudit.gz 214,170KB bsm.list.gz  50KB 
Sixth week
Friday pascal.praudit.gz 194,590KB bsm.list.gz  43KB 
Monday pascal.praudit.gz 227,808KB bsm.list.gz  39KB 
Tuesday pascal.praudit      195,461KB bsm.list.gz  5KB 
Wednesday pascal.praudit.gz 195,461KB bsm.list.gz  35KB 
Thursday pascal.praudit.gz 415,893KB bsm.list.gz  32KB 
Seventh 
week 
Friday pascal.praudit.gz 226,327KB bsm.list.gz  42KB 
1799  06/01/1998 08:07:47 00:01:09 telnet 1814 23 172.016.114.168 
172.016.112.050 0 - 
Figure 3.6 Example of session information on BSM list file of Monday, first week. 
 






subject,2122,root,other,root,other,273,258,0 0 pascal.eyrie.af.mil 
return,success,0 
trailer,182 
Figure 3.7 Example of description for a system event in BSM audit file of Monday, first 
week. 
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files. In the case of Monday, first week 1998 data set, for example, the size of the BSM 
list file is 26 KB and one of the BSM audit file 174,618 KB.  
BSM list file serves information such as index, start time, duration, source and 
destination IP address, and the nature, normal or attack, of each session in a host 
machine. Figure 3.6 shows that session 1799 started at 08:07:47 June 1, 1998 and lasted 
for one minute and nine seconds and it was a normal session with source IP, 
172.016.114.168, and destination IP, 172.016.112.050. 
A BSM audit file contains information corresponding to each system event made by a 
host. The information such as event type, session ID, process ID, IP address, occurrence 
time and so on for the event is stored in the audit file whenever a system event occurs in a 
host machine. Figure 3.7 shows the information for a system event stored in the audit file 
of Monday, first week. The event was “ioctl(2)” type, occurred on Monday the first of 
June 1998 and belonged to process 273 of session 258 according to the information on 
Figure 3.7. 
Statistics of features from a session were required for our method to judge if the session 
was an attack or a normal session. More possible kinds of statistics for a session extracted 
from BSM files make more useful information available in intrusion detection system. 
Most research has tried to get diverse statistics of a session from BSM audit files and to 
only identify attack or normal sessions from BSM list files. In this study, there were three 
steps to get session statistics for our analysis. We used Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 
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programming language to process BSM files and obtain statistics of interest from BSM 
audit files and list files. Figure 3.8 shows the procedure of data preprocessing. 
First, events in a BSM audit file were categorized into sessions according to session ID of 
the event. Session-named files, corresponding to each session respectively, were created 
to contain information of system events belonged to the session. Table 3.6 shows how 
many sessions and how many system events appeared in a day from the DARPA 98 BSM 
audit files. For example, 744,085 system events from the BSM audit file of Monday first 
week 1998 data set were allocated into 182 session files.  
Second, various features were extracted from a session file according to the feature 
descriptions in table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Before extracting features related to event types, we 
 














session ID Attack/Normal X1 X2 X3
wk3_Mon_2220 1 0 0 0
wk1_Mon_1773 1 0 0.314406 6.98E-04
wk1_Mon_1799 0 0 5.17E-04 4.73E-06
Feature data
Labeled data
Figure 3.8 Procedure of data preprocessing
91699,61,Jun 02 11:11:00,998294045,1040,1040,0.0.0.0 
91700,41,Jun 02 11:11:00,998294045,1040,1040,0.0.0.0 
91701,25,Jun 02 11:11:00,998294045,1040,1040,0.0.0.0 
91702,9,Jun 02 11:11:00,998294045,1040,1040,0.0.0.0 
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needed to know what kinds of system events exist in the DARPA 98 BSM data set. It 
turned out that there are 75 types of system events in the BSM files by searching all audit 
data files. Figure 3.9 shows the list of 75 system event types. As a result of feature 
extraction, 246 features were obtained from each session file as seen in table 3.7. 
Third, sessions were labeled with normal or attack by referring a BSM list file. 
Unfortunately, session indices in a BSM list file are not consistent with the session ID’s 
in a BSM audit file and the number of sessions of both BSM files, also, are significantly 
different. Because BSM list file records sequentially session information of all hosts in 
the network whereas BSM audit file stores information for only a specific host. For 
example of Monday first week 1998 data set, there are 308 sessions in the BSM list file, 
compared to 182 sessions in the BSM audit file. We used start time, duration and IP 
address of sessions as matching criteria to relate a session in BSM audit file with a 
session in BSM list file instead of session index. By performing the matching procedure 
on first week Monday 1998 data set, for example, 178 session files were labeled with 
normal and two sessions with attack. We applied our data pre-processing method on 
seven-week training data of 1998 data with about 40,495,000 system events to obtain a 
data set to be ready for our analysis. As a result of the pre-processing, we got data with 
246 variables for 7,632 normal sessions and 456 attack sessions as in table 3.8. 
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Table 3.6 Numbers of sessions and system events in the DARPA 98 BSM audit files 
 
Date Number of sessions Number of system events 
Monday 182 744,085 
Tuesday 148 778,781 
Wednesday 277 1,094,935 
Thursday 194 767,926 
First week 
Friday 184 819,471 
Monday 174 661,129 
Tuesday 150 595,198 
Wednesday 196 800,938 
Thursday 179 780,361 
Second 
week 
Friday 197 906,479 
Monday 431 2,397,774 
Tuesday 205 1,121,967 
Wednesday 204 2,759,945 
Thursday 363 1,713,695 
Third 
week 
Friday 210 891,696 
Monday 330 941,820 
Tuesday 339 1,320,478 
Wednesday 163 768,152 
Thursday 322 903,596 
Fourth 
week 
Friday 184 2,249,503 
Monday 364 1,938,514 
Tuesday 212 1,116,098 
Wednesday 192 845,300 
Thursday 226 1,829,613 
Fifth week 
Friday 196 875,700 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
 
Date Number of sessions Number of system events 
Monday 337 1,815,737 
Tuesday 209 1,108,912 
Wednesday 202 850,350 
Thursday 239 925,079 
Sixth week 
Friday 213 840,072 
Monday 208 948,058 
Tuesday 191 829,151 
Wednesday 191 829,151 
Thursday 331 1,775,358 
Seventh 
week 
Friday 215 950,400 
Table 3.7 Features extracted from the DARPA 98 BSM dataset 
Groups Variable number 
Overall length 1-5 
Length by process duration time  6-17 
Length 
Length by number of system events in a process 18-29 
Overall intensity 30-31 
Process level intensity 32-77 
Intensity 
System event level intensity 78-93 
Event diversity 94-96 Events 
Event frequency 97-246 
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accept(2) kill(2) pathdonf(2) 
access(2) link(2) pipe(2) 
audit(2) login - local putmsg(2) 
auditon(2) - get audit state login - telnet putmsg-connect 
bind(2) logout putpmsg(2) 
chdir(2) lstat(2) readlink(2) 
chmod(2) memcntl(2) recvfrom(2) 
chown(2) mkdir(2) rename(2) 
close(2) mknod(2) rmdir(2) 
connect(2) mmap(2) sendto(2) 
creat(2) munmap(2) setaudit(2) 
doorfs(2) - DOOR_CALL old nice(2) setegid(2) 
doorfs(2) - 
DOOR_CREATE old setgid(2) seteuid(2) 
execve(2) old setuid(2) setgroups(2) 
exit(2) old utime(2) setpgrp(2) 
fchdir(2) open(2) - read setrlimit(2) 
fchmod(2) open(2) - read,write setsockopt(2) 
fchown(2) open(2) - read,write,creat socket(2) 
fcntl(2) open(2) - read,write,creat,trunc stat(2) 
fork(2) open(2) - read,write,trunc statvfs(2) 
fork1(2) open(2) - write su 
getaudit(2) open(2) - write,creat symlink(2) 
getmsg(2) open(2) - write,creat,trunc sysinfo(2) 
inetd open(2) - write,trunc unlink(2) 
ioctl(2) pathconf(2) vfork(2) 
Figure 3.9 List of 75 system event types 
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Table 3.8 Data resulted from pre-processing procedure 
 
Normal Attack Total 
Number of sessions 7,632 456 8,088 
3.4 Experiment based on the DARPA 98 BSM Data 
3.4.1 Experimental setup 
We made a smaller set of data from the larger pre-processed data for our experiment. We 
extracted data of 3051 normal sessions for the last five weeks from seven-week training 
data in the 1998 data set which is considered as more representative for ordinary 
activities than the first two weeks. Data for 456 attacks from the whole seven weeks were 
used in our analysis without any omission of the data since our experiment needed much 
attack data as possible to get more reliable results. Our data set for the experiment 
comprises 3,051 normal session and 456 attack session data.   
We randomly divided the data set into the training data and the testing data for our 
experiment as shown in table 3.9. About 16% of the normal data and 20% of the attack 
data came to be a training data and the remaining of the data became the testing data. 
Table 3.9 shows the number of samples in the training and testing data. 
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Table 3.9 Number of samples in data set 
Training data Testing data 
Normal sessions Attack sessions Normal sessions Attack sessions 
500 91 2551 365 
Support vector data description (SVDD) was used as anomaly detection technique for the 
performance experiment of the proposed feature framework. SVDD is a one-class 
classification originated from the support vector machines (SVMs). One-class 
classification method tries to detect which sample is similar to training data based on a 
description of this training data set. This method is able to detect outliers which have 
different characteristics with training data as well. The basic idea of the SVDD method is 
to find a spherically-shaped small boundary that envelops most of data of interest. The 
hypersphere should have minimum volume as possible and simultaneously contain as 
many data as possible in order to minimize the possibility of accepting outlier data. The 
more details on SVDD are in Tax and Duin (2004) and the application of SVDD in 
intrusion detection is explained in Tao et al. (2004) and Yang et al. (2004). 
An evaluation of intrusion detection system requires the estimation of two quantities: 
false alarm rate and attack detection rate. False alarm occurs when a normal session is 
assigned to attack by the trained SVDD boundary. False alarm rate is calculated by the 
number of false alarm over the number of normal sessions in testing data. Attack 
detection rate is the probability of correctly detecting the presence of the attack session 
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by the boundary. The performance of our method was measured by calculating false 
alarm rates and detection rates for the data set. 
3.4.2 New feature framework results 
Table 3.10 shows the performance results of new feature framework for the data set from 
the 1998 DARPA BSM data compared with the existing features. The results of 
performance are 99.73% of detection rate with 2.63% of false alarm rate for the testing 
data. Chen et al. (2005) applied Support vector machine (SVM) with tf×idf scheme and 
Artificial neural networks (ANN) with frequency scheme for the 1998 DARPA BSM 
data. Compared to the best results in Chen et al., SVDD with the features from the 
proposed new framework showed higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate.  
3.4.3 Performance comparison among three feature groups 
Table 3.11 shows the performances of three individual feature categories and combined 
two feature categories. Among the individual categories, the event type feature group 
achieved the best performance, showing 100% detection rate and reasonable false alarm  
Table 3.10 Detection performance comparison between two existing features and the 
proposed features extracted by the new framework 
Data Attack detection rate False alarm rate 
SVDD with proposed features 99.73% 2.63% 
SVM with tf×idf scheme* 99.60% 2.87% 
ANN with frequency scheme* 99.20% 4.94% 
* Best results of Chen et al. (2005) 
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Table 3.11 Performance comparison among individual feature categories, combined two 
categories, and all three categories 
 
Feature groups Number of features used 
Attack detection 
rate (%) 
False alarm rate 
(%) 
Length 29 4.93 1.61 
Intensity 64 97.26 46.18 Individual category 
Event type* 153 100.00 3.88 
Length + 
Intensity* 93 99.73 2.78 
Length + 
Event type 182 3.29 1.22 
Combined 
two 
categories Intensity + 
Event type 217 100.00 20.38 
All three categories* 246 99.73 2.63 
* Three feature categories showing best performances. 
 
rate. The intensity feature group brought good detection rate, over 97%, whereas its false 
alarm rate is too high, over 46%. The worst performance among the three groups came 
from the length feature group which showed very low detection rate, under 5%. Both the 
length and intensity categories turned out to be not practical for intrusion detection 
because of their unreasonable low detection rate and high false alarm rate, respectively. 
However, features combined with the two categories showed surprisingly good 
performance, 99.73% detection rates and 2.78% false alarm rate. Individual event type 
category and features combined with length and intensity were as good as all 246 features 




Chapter 4 Differentiated Intrusion Detection 
 
This chapter provides differentiated intrusion detection methodology. Section 4.1 
presents motivations of the proposed method. Introduction to SVDD is presented in 
Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents mathematical formulation for differentiated intrusion 
detection. The proposed differentiated anomaly intrusion detection is explained in detail 
in Section 4.4. Finally, experiment with simulated data and the DARPA data and the 
results are presented in Section 4.5.  
 
4.1 Motivation 
There exists more harmful type of attack to an information system among intrusion types. 
According to 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey, the most common 
attack type was “computer virus” and the attack type causing the biggest loss per case 
was “unauthorized access to information” in the United States as seen in table 4.1. The 
unauthorized access to information is the most critical attack type especially in an 
organization with confidential information on its computer network systems which 
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Table 4.1 Most frequent top seven attack types and their loss amounts 






Virus 65 15,691,460 241,407 
Laptop/mobile theft 47 6,642,660 141,333 
Insider abuse of Net access 42 1,849,810 44,043 
Unauthorized access to 
information 32 10,617,000 331,781
Denial of service 25 2,922,010 116,880 
System penetration 15 758,000 50,533  
Abuse of wireless network 14 469,010 33,501
* Source: 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey 
 
should not be released to the public. Because it is expected to bring huge negative 
consequences such as operational trouble, financial loss and reputation damage of the 
organization when the attack passes through its defense layers including authentication, 
encryption, firewall, and intrusion detection system. Therefore, a system administrator 
needs to more strictly detect intrusions of the worst attack type to her organization while 
detecting other ordinary attacks. Existing anomaly intrusion detection techniques do not 
support this task. 
In the existing anomaly detection methods, all attacks are treated with equal importance 
regardless of their types. For example, a denial of service attack which blocks victim 
system’s whole operation and brings severe loss is regarded as only one of anomalies as 
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same as a probe attack which merely searches weak points of the system without 
disturbing the system operation. There is no anomaly detection method which 
differentiates attack types by their harmfulness when training its classifier.  
Although there are anomaly detection techniques which identify the type of attack, they 
still can not perform intrusion detection with different weights on intrusion types. KDD 
’99 classifier learning contest was to create a predictive model to distinguish five 
categories such as normal, probe, denial of service, user-to-root and remote-to-local 
(Levin, 2000). Wang (2005) proposed a multinomial logistic regression approach for 
anomaly intrusion detection in which one record is assigned one of the above five 
categories based on 13 risk factors. Since those approaches aim at classifying intrusion 
types, they are not useful in differentiated detection on attack types. 
This dissertation proposes a novel differentiated detection approach for anomaly intrusion 
detection to perform tighter detection on a targeted attack type and ordinary detection on 
nontargeted attack types. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such approach for 
anomaly intrusion detection. The main idea is to use regularization parameter in support 
vector data description (SVDD) as a weight factor for a targeted type of attack on how 
strictly it is detected compared to nontargeted types. The higher weight for a targeted 
attack type means that the type is more harmful and needs to be more strictly detected 
than the nontargeted types. SVDD is a one-class classifier which was developed by Tax 
and Duin (2004) and Tao et al. (2004) introduced it as anomaly intrusion detection 
method to the field of intrusion detection for the first time. 
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4.2 Introduction to SVDD 
One-class classification method tries to detect which sample is similar to training data 
based on a description of this training data set. This method is able to detect outliers 
which have different characteristics with training data. It is quite useful in solving a 
classification problem in which samples for one of the classes are plentiful and samples 
for the others are very few. SVDD is a one-class classification originated from the 
support vector machines (SVMs).  
The basic idea of the SVDD method is to find a spherically-shaped small boundary that 
envelops most of data of interest. The hypersphere should have minimum volume as 
possible and simultaneously contain as many data as possible in order to minimize the 
possibility of accepting outlier data. Given N observations of normal data with p
variables { }nxxx ,..,, 21 , the hypersphere of SVDD with a radius R and a center µ is 





to envelop all normal data. Minimizing the volume of the hypersphere is represented with 
minimizing R2 with respect to R and µ. It is possible that there exist a few outliers in 
training data set and we can not distinguish them from normal data, thereby bigger sphere 
may be obtained. To prevent this consequence we need to penalize outliers’ participation 
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in constructing the hypersphere. Therefore, slack variables )0(≥iξ are introduced to 









2. ξ (4.2) 
 
where the parameter C gives the trade-off between the volume of the sphere and the 
number of observations outside. Equation (4.1) changes into the following constraints 
that almost all observations are within the sphere: 
 
.,0,22 iR iii ∀≥+≤− ξξµx (4.3) 
 
By introducing the Lagrange multipliers for inequality conditions of equation (4.3), we 





















with 0≥iα and 0≥iβ . The solution of equation (4.4) is obtained by setting partial 

































Since αi = C - βi from equation (4.7), 0≥iα , and 0≥iβ , we can remove the Lagrange 













)()( xxxx ααα . (4.8) 
 
A set of αi is obtained by maximizing of equation (4.8) with Ci ≤≤α0 . According to the 
Kuhn-Tucker complementarity’s condition, the following equation should be true at the 
optimal solution (Park et al., 2005):  
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iR iii ∀=−−− ,0)(
22 ξα µx (4.9) 
 
When a sample xi satisfies the inequality ii R ξ+<−
22µx , that is, sample xi is within 
the hypersphere, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier is zero, i.e., αi = 0 from equation 
(4.9). For samples satisfying the equality ii R ξ+=−
22µx that are on the boundary or 
outside the sphere, the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are not zero, i.e., αi > 0. The 
center of the sphere µ is a linear combination of the samples according to equation (4.6). 
SVDD needs only samples xi with αi>0 which are called support vectors of the SVDD. 
Once the SVDD is constructed on the training data, we need to decide whether a given 
test sample z is normal or outlier. The criterion for the decision can be stated as:  
 
)()( 22 RzIzf ≤−= µ (4.10) 
 
where I(condition) equals to one if the condition is true and zero otherwise.  
We can get a better description of normal data by incorporating attack samples in the 
SVDD training when they are available. Considering M attacks available in the training 


































where iξ and kξ are slack variables for normal data ix and attack data kx .
The boundary of the hypersphere around the data is not flexible and often not a good 
description. For more flexible boundaries, inner products of samples )( ji xx ⋅ as shown in 
equation (4.8) is replaced by a kernel function ),( jiK xx , where ),( jiK xx  satisfies 
Mercer’s theorem (Schölkopf et al., 1998). This kernel trick implicitly carries out 
mapping samples into a nonlinear feature space to obtain a tighter boundary. By 












),(),( xxxx ααα (4.12) 
 
with constraints Ci ≤≤α0 and ∑ =i i 1α . By the use of a kernel function, the execution 
of the nonlinear mappings and the dot products in a nonlinear feature space becomes 
unnecessary (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995). The most commonly used kernel functions are the 




( )σ/exp),( 2jijiK xxxx −−= (4.13) 
d
jijiK )(),( xxxx ⋅= (4.14) 
 
A boundary of the SVDD depends on which kernel function is used to train the 
description. Gaussian kernel produces tighter description than the polynomial function in 
SVDD according to Tax and Duin (2004).  
The value of the regularization parameter C can be determined by using the false alarm 







When C is set to 1, it requests the boundary which should accept all target data and reject 
all outlier data. Figure 4.1 shows the description obtained using Gaussian kernel for a 
simple two dimensional data set with outliers. The closed solid curve is the boundary 
which distinguishes normal data indicated with star symbols from attack data represented 




Figure 4.1 Example of data description trained with outliers 
 
4.3 Formulation for Differentiated Intrusion Detection 
Let us consider a training data set with N samples of normal data, L of targeted attack 
type and M of nontargeted attack type. When the targeted attack type needs to be more 






















































are regularization parameters and slack variables, respectively, for normal data ix ,
targeted attack type data *jx and nontargeted attack types data 
**
kx . Equation (4.16) 















































































with the Lagrange multipliers 0≥iα , 0≥iβ , 0
* ≥jα , 0
* ≥jβ , 0
** ≥kα and 0
** ≥kβ . The 


























































































The terms with partial derivatives set to zero in equation (4.18) produce simplified forms. 

























































































i ααα (4.20) 
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We obtain equation (4.22) from the partial derivative with respect to µ:
( ) ( ) ( )













































































































































































































xxxµ ααα (4.22) 
 












































Since ii C βα −= 1 from equation (4.23), 0≥iα , and 0≥iβ , we can remove the 









*0 Cj ≤≤ α , 3
**0 Ck ≤≤ α .
By incorporating equations (4.20), (4.22) and (4.23) into ),,,,( *** kjiRL ξξξµ of equation 








kx . The terms of R in L







































i RRRRR αααααα (4.24) 
 









































kjiRL ξξξµ of equation (4.18), it 
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And the third line on equation (4.27) is reduced to 2µ by equation (4.20). The 
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L in equation (4.27) is rewritten as: 
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The equation (4.18) is transformed into: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )























































































The solution of equation (4.31) is a set of values for ***,, kji ααα . The following relation 
between the Lagrange multipliers ***,, kji ααα and the constraints of equation (4.16) are 


























From equation (4.32), it is true that a normal observation ix satisfies the constraint of 
equation (4.16) when the corresponding Lagrange multiplier iα =0.  ix with iα =0 is 
inside the boundary, ix with 10 Ci <<α is on the boundary, and ix with 1Ci =α is 



























For the targeted attack samples, *jx , an observation with 
*
jα =0 is outside the boundary, 
one with 2
*0 Cj <<α on the boundary, and the other with 2



























































The following lemma is derived to explain the relationship between the number of 
detected targeted attacks and its regularization parameter value. This lemma can be used 
as a guideline to determine the appropriate value of regularization parameters for a given 
level of detection for the targeted attack type. 
 
Lemma 1: Let fN , uL and uM be the number of false alarms of normal data, the 
number of undetected attacks of the targeted type and nontargeted types, respectively. 
Then, the following relationship holds between these parameters and the regularization 
parameters: 
( )2 1 31 f u
u
C N C M C
L
= − + constant    (4.36) 
 




kα for observations 


















































































































































Assuming that the terms in the second bracket of the equation are constant, the equation 







It is obvious from the lemma 1 that the number of detections of a targeted attack type 
increases by raising the value of its regularization parameter and by fixing the 
regularization parameters for normal data and nontargeted types of attacks. The lemma is 
a theoretical basis for the proposed differentiated anomaly intrusion detection of the 
targeted type of attack. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the effect of the differentiated detection on data set where targeted 
attack type locates in the opposite place of the nontargeted attack type across the normal 
data. The dashed boundary of differentiated detection detects more attacks of targeted 
type but less attacks of nontargeted type than the solid line boundary of the ordinary 
detection. As seen in figure, differentiated detection moved the boundary away from the 
targeted attack type, that is, toward the nontargeted attack type and the resulted boundary 
enclosed more attack data of nontargeted type indicated with small circles. 
 
Figure 4.2 Comparison of the ordinary detection boundary with the boundary for the 
differentiated intrusion detection. Solid line boundary(ordinary detection), dashed line 




4.4 Differentiated Anomaly Intrusion Detection 
4.4.1 Selecting magnitudes of regularization parameter 2C
The magnitude of regularization parameter for targeted attack represents the power of the 
differentiated detection on the attack. Larger magnitude forces a classifier to detect more 
intrusions of the attack type. Basic unit of the magnitude is the value of 1/[(1 – desired 
detection rate for all attacks) ዊ� (number of attack data in the training data)] which is 
ordinarily set in SVDD training. One unit magnitude of the parameter for targeted attack 
type means that all attack types are treated with same importance. The magnitude of 
larger than one unit gives more weights on targeted attack detection than the nontargeted 
attack type detection. According to our pre-experiments about the maximum magnitude 
with practical meanings, it was between 200 and 500 at most. After the magnitude 
reaches the value, there is no change in the differentiated detection results no matter how 
large the magnitude is over it. Also, the performance of differentiated detection is 
sensitive on the small magnitudes such as two and three units rather than large value like 
100 units. For the differentiated detection to find the best magnitude, we recommend 
setting its range from two to 500 units and using detailed intervals especially on the 
smaller values. 
4.4.2 Monotonic increase and number of training data 
According to the lemma 1, monotonic increase on detections of targeted attacks is 
expected as a regular result of rising regularization parameter. However, it rarely happens 
in the real situation with limited number of data which does not distribute evenly. Only 
72
when there are so many data of targeted attack and normal near the boundary that the 
classifiers from the differentiated detection can be elaborate, the monotonic rising would 
be possible. It is recommended for finer classifiers of the differentiated detection that as 
many available data as possible are used for the training. 
4.4.3 SVDD parameters 
For training its classifiers, SVDD requires parameters to be determined such as desired 
false alarm rate for normal data, desired detection rate of all attacks, type of kernel, and 
parameters of the kernel. Usually, desired false alarm rate and detection rate are set to 5% 
and 90%, respectively. The most commonly used kernel functions are the Gaussian 
function and the polynomial function. The each parameter for the kernels such as the 
bandwidth of Gaussian, σ , and the degree of the polynomial, d , is decided to yield the 
best results by using cross validation on the training data. Selecting a proper kernel type 
for a data set depends on the nature of the data although Gaussian kernel is better than the 
polynomial function in SVDD according to Tax and Duin (2004). The kernel showing 
better result is selected after training the classifier for each kernel function.  
4.4.4 Selecting the level of differentiated detection 
The differentiated detection of a targeted attack type could produce negative effects for 
identifying normal data and nontargeted attack types, despite serving best for detection of 
the targeted attack type. Sometimes, we cannot allow a huge number of false alarms and 
undergo failures to detect nontargeted types of attacks for the sake of only tiny 
improvement in detection of a targeted attack. We need to decide what level of 
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differentiated detection is reasonable while also considering its positive and negative 
effects. This can be determined by calculating the gain and the loss that will result from 
increased detection of targeted attacks or from failing to detect them. The gain is the 
savings from detecting targeted attacks that otherwise would have resulted in losses. The 
loss can be measured in the costs of handling additional false alarms and undetected non-
targeted types of attacks. Let the benefit function of the gain and the loss from 
regularization parameter magnitude i be )(iB . The best level of differentiated detection 
is ∗i that maximizes the value of )(iB over all i .
4.4.5 Steps of differentiated detection 
Step 1. Identifying targeted attack type: Identify which attack type is most harmful to the 
information system and requires differentiated detection. 
Step 2. Data preparation: Prepare a data set to be used for the differentiated detection. 
Based on the required feature formats, data is collected separately for normal activities, 
the targeted attack type, and nontargeted attack types.  
Step 3. Selecting parameters: SVDD parameters, magnitude intervals, and the range of 
the regularization parameter of the targeted attack need to be given proper values for 
differentiated detection. 
Step 4. Running the model up to convergence: Run the SVDD-based differentiated 
detection model and collect the results, such as the number of additional detections of 
targeted attacks and nontargeted attack types, and the increased number of false alarms. If 
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the results do not converge, raise the maximum magnitude of the regularization 
parameter, insert more intervals between the existing and new maximum magnitudes, and 
run the model again. Repeat until the results show convergence. 
Step 5. Choosing the best classifier among trained SVDD classifiers: If the benefit 
function of gain and loss that results from differentiated detection is known, select, based 
on the results of step 4, the classifier with the maximum benefit function value. 
Otherwise, choose from among the trained classifiers the classifier showing the largest 
number of detections of the targeted type of attacks.  
 
4.5 Experiments of Differentiated Intrusion Detection 
4.5.1 Experimental setup 
The experiment for the proposed differentiated intrusion detection method was conducted 
by using two data sets: simulated data and the same data as used in the experiment for the 
new framework. The simulated data was artificially generated from normal and two 
attack classes in a two-dimensional data space for the experiment. The center of normal 
class located at (0, 0) and two attack class centers were at (1, 1) and (-1, -1), respectively. 
Two components of all the samples were independently corrupted by Gaussian noise with 
standard deviations 0.2 and 0.24.  
The performance of the differentiated intrusion detection was demonstrated with the 
simulated data set in which there were four training data sets and one testing data set as 
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seen in table 4.2. There were two factors related to the differentiated detection 
performance: relative magnitude of the regularization parameter for targeted attack type 
compared to one for nontargeted attack types and the number of samples of targeted 
attack in the training data. The magnitude of targeted attack’s regularization parameter 
was set to twelve magnitudes ranging two to 500 times bigger than the nontargeted 
attack’s. For the number of targeted attack samples, four different training data groups 
with 10, 20, 30, and 40 samples of targeted attack, respectively, were considered and 10 
data sets were sampled for each group, thereby getting 40 training data sets in total. Then 
a SVDD classifier was trained with each of 40 data sets combined with one of the twelve 
regularization parameter’s magnitudes. By applying its classifier into the testing data, the 
result for each data set was measured as the number of detections on targeted attack, the 
number of false alarms and the number of detections on nontargeted attack. The 
performance of the differentiated detection for each four training data group was the 
summation of its ten results. 40 runs of SVDD were required to get desired results from 
the simulated data. The pre-processed DARPA-MITLL 1998 BSM data in table 3.9 was 
used to check how well the differentiated intrusion detection works in the real situation. 
In this experiment, all the SVDD trainings were performed with outliers since there were 
attack data available. Polynomial kernel with degree of one was used in training SVDD 
for the DARPA data set whereas Gaussian kernel was used for the simulated data set 
because they achieved better performance. In all the experiments, the fraction rejection 
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Number of data sets 10 10 10 10 1 
Normal  200 200 200 200 2000 
Targeted 
attack 
10 20 30 40 400 Number of samples 
per data set Nontargeted 
attack  
10 20 30 40 400 
for SVDD was set to 0.05, where 5% of normal data is expected to lie on or out of the 
boundary of classifier. The data description toolbox (dd_tools) 1.4.0 of Tax (2005) was 
modified and used as our SVDD running tool. 
4.5.2 Results on simulated data 
The proposed differentiated detection was effective on all the training data sets. The 
detection of targeted attacks was improved by the differentiated detection on the targeted 
type, showing 54 to 188 more detections compared to the ordinary intrusion detection as 
seen in table 4.3.  
The extent of the improvement became larger along with increasing number of targeted 
attack samples in the training data. For example, 5.1% improvement was achieved in the 
training data set number four with 40 targeted attack samples while only 1.5% 
improvement in detection number came out from the group number one with 10 samples. 
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Table 4.3 Number of detected samples of targeted attack by the differentiated detection 
on the targeted type with four training data set groups. 
 
Training data set group Number of detections  
on targeted attack type #1 #2 #3 #4 
Maximum in the weighed detection 3,665 3,691 3,829 3,874 
At ordinary detection* 3,611 3,635 3,653 3,686 
Improvement  










* Ordinary detection was performed with the same weights, magnitude=1, for both of 
targeted type and nontargeted attack type 
** (Maximum number of detections on targeted attack type in the weighed detection) – 
(Number of detections on targeted attack type in the ordinary detection) 
 
Figure 4.3 depicts the trends of changing detection rates on the targeted attack resulted 
from magnitude increases for all the four data sets. As the number of targeted attack 
samples increased in the training data, detection rate improved more smoothly with less 
deterioration. In case of training with 10 targeted type samples, there were only four time 
improvements and four time deteriorations on detection rate out of twelve differentiated 
detections. This contrasts to the results of training with 40 samples that all the 
differentiated detections showed better detection rates than the ordinary detection and 
there were only three little deteriorations. Another finding was that detection rates 
converged earlier with smaller number of attack samples in the training data. As seen in 
figure 4.3, the convergences appeared at magnitude 20 in data group number one, at 50 in 
data two, at 100 in data three, and at 200 in data number four. The value of magnitude for 










































Figure 4.3 Change on detection rates of targeted attack type along with increasing 
magnitudes of regularization parameter of the targeted type according to differentiated 
detections on the type with four training data sets. 
 
The differentiated detection with the training data group four showed the most similar 
results as our expectations based on the lemma. More detection of targeted attacks, more 
false alarms, and less detection of the nontargeted attacks which locate in the opposite 
across the normal data were expected as responses to increasing magnitudes in the 
differentiated detection. Figure 4.4 depicts the results of differentiated detections on the 
group four data. As the magnitude of the regularization parameter for targeted attack type 
increased, targeted attack detection increased almost monotonically, nontargeted attacks 
were gradually less detected, and false alarms increased roughly. It is obvious that those 
results are consistent with the expectation. More samples of targeted attack type are 

















Magnitudes of regularizatoin parameter for the target 
attack type
# of detections for the
target attack
# of detections for
non-target attack
# of false alarms on
normal data
Figure 4.4 Changing trend of number of detections on both targeted attack type and 
nontargeted attack type and number of false alarms of normal data with increasing 
magnitudes of regularization parameter of the targeted type resulted from differentiated 
detections on the targeted type with training data group number four 
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4.5.3 Results on the DARPA data 
The differentiated detection on U2R attack type detected at most six more attacks. U2R 
attack type was selected to apply the differentiated detection since it was thought the 
most harmful attack type in our data based on the 1998 DARPA BSM data set. Table 4.4 
shows the results for the differentiated detection of U2R attack type. When the magnitude 
was four, the differentiated detection produced the largest additional detections of U2R 
attack with 22 more false alarms. Also it detected five additional attacks of the 
nontargeted types, which means that nontargeted types of attacks locate near U2R and the 
differentiated detection on U2R is effective on them too. However, there was no further 
improvement on differentiated detection of U2R after magnitudes reached to four. The 
convergence of results appeared from the magnitude 50. Effective results of the 
differentiated detection on U2R came out in only three cases of 2, 4, and 15 magnitudes. 
From the remaining nine cases of all the twelve magnitudes, we found interesting results, 
decreased false alarms without any negative impacts on detecting attacks. It is noticeable 
that these results are better than ordinary intrusion detection because of their less false 
alarms with same detection capability.  
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Table 4.4 Results for the differentiated detection on U2R attack type compared to 









number of U2R 
attacks by the 
differentiated 
detection 
Number of additional 
false alarms resulted 
from the differentiated 
detection  
Additionally detected 
number of nontargeted 
attack types by the 
differentiated 
detection 
2 1 3 0
3 0 -26 0 
4 6 22 5 
5 0 -2 0 
7 0 -26 0 
10 0 -31 0 
15 1 4 0 
20 0 -26 0 
50 0 -11 0 
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Chapter 5 SVDD-based Feature Selection 
 
This chapter provides SVDD-based feature selection methods. Section 5.1 presents 
motivations of the proposed methods. Introduction to feature selection for anomaly 
detection is presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 presents mathematical 
formulations and algorithms for SVDD-R2-RFE, SVDD-RFE and SVD-Gradient feature 
selection methods, respectively. Finally, experiment of three methods with simulated data 
and the DARPA data and the results are presented in Section 5.6.  
 
5.1 Motivation 
Feature selection in a classification problem is to select most predictive features for 
classification results among whole features. The number of features to be considered for a 
classification can be reduced by using feature selection method. Smaller number of 
features means less effort to get and process data. Therefore, feature selection contributes 
cost and time reduction for solving classification problems. When a problem has huge 
number of features, the trial to get a solution of the problem would fail because of 
impractically large computation. In that case, only feature selection may make the 
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problem practical. Also, feature selection can identify irrelevant or redundant features for 
a problem which does not add any information to the classifier. By removing them from 
the feature set to be considered, the remaining features have more discriminating power 
than whole features. Feature selection is invaluable in data dimension reduction and 
discriminating improvement for classification problems with large number of features. 
There are feature selection methods devoted only for a certain type of classification 
method like SVM-RFE (Support Vector Machine Recursive Feature Elimination) (Youn, 
2004) while some algorithms for feature selection such as SBS (Sequential Backward 
Selection) and SFS (Sequential Forward Selection) are generally applicable in most data 
mining techniques. SVDD is introduced in 2004 and there is no feature selection method 
solely dedicated to SVDD.  In this paper, SVDD-based feature selection method is 
developed. 
 
5.2 Introduction to Feature Selection for Anomaly Detection 
Feature selection has been deeply studied for the application areas in which datasets with 
thousands of features exist. The general objectives of feature selection are to improve the 
performance of the predictors, provide more effective predictors and a better 
understanding of the dataset (Guyon & Elisseeff, 2003). Although many researched have 
been performed for classification problems, there are very few studies of feature selection 
for anomaly detection. 
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General two components of feature selection are criterion function and subset searching 
method. Criterion function is to measure the prediction performance of single feature or 
feature subset. Subset searching method is an algorithm to explore feature subset space to 
find the best subset of features with maximum value of criterion function. Many 
researches for feature selection are to find better criterion function and more efficient 
searching algorithms. 
Feature ranking is a feature selection method to evaluate the prediction power of 
individual feature based on its criterion function. Subset searching algorithm is not 
required in this method because only individual feature rankings are desired.  Since it is 
simple, scalable, and empirically successful, feature ranking has been widely used in 
various literatures (Guyon & Elisseeff, 2003). Examples of feature ranking are 
correlation criteria (Furey et al., 2000; Tusher et al., 2001), single variable classifiers 
(Forman, 2003), and information theoretic ranking criteria (Bekkerman et al., 2003; 
Dhillon et al., 2003).  
Feature subset selection is a genuine feature selection method which needs both criterion 
function and subset searching algorithm. There are three categories in feature subset 
selection: wrappers, filters, and embedded methods. Wrappers proposed by Kohavi and 
John (1997) uses the prediction performance of a given classifiers to measure the 
predictive power of feature subsets. SBS and SFS have been used for wrappers. Filters 
choose feature subset independently of the chosen predictors. Since filters are faster than 
other two methods by using heuristic algorithms, they can be used as a preprocessing step 
to reduce dimensionality. Embedded methods carry out feature selection as a part of the 
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training process and are dependent on given classification method. SVM-RFE is an 
example of embedded methods. 
Those general approaches of feature selection can be applicable to anomaly detection 
area. Wang et al. (2004) proposed the integration of SVM-based anomaly detection 
system with feature selection function using specification. The feature selection of Wang 
et al. (2004) belongs to filters method. However, there is no literature dedicated to the 
anomaly detection method itself to my best knowledge of it. 
 
5.3 SVDD-R2-RFE Feature Selection Method 
5.3.1 Idea 
SVDD constructs a boundary that envelops most of normal data. It detects anomalies 
which locate out of the boundary. The performance of SVDD is dependent on how well 
the established boundary represents normal data and discriminates anomalies from them. 
As seen in equation (4.2), the objective function of SVDD is to minimize the size of the 
boundary that is measured by value of its radius square. Figure 5.1 shows why tighter 
boundary is desirable then larger one. Larger boundary A can not detect anomalies that 
are close to normal data while smaller boundary B can. Therefore, a good feature for 
SVDD is to contribute to making smaller boundary for normal data.  
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Figure 5.1 Contrast of small boundary to large boundary. Tiny triangles represent normal 
and small circles anomalies. 
 
The size of boundary is measured by its radius square. Let )( kJ − be value of the size of 
boundary which was trained with 1−n features excluding feature k . The worst feature is 
*k feature maximizing )( kJ − over all k s. 
The searching method combined with the proposed criterion function is Recursive 
Feature Elimination (RFE) which was introduced in the literature. RFE is an iterative 
procedure: first, train the classifier, second, compute the criterion function for each single 
feature and finally, remove the worst feature with largest value of the criterion function. 
5.3.2 Formulation 
Formulations for SVDD-R2-RFE feature selection method are given for two cases of 
available data: case 1 in which only normal data is available for training and case 2 in 
which both normal and anomaly data exist in training data set. 
 
Boundary A Boundary B 
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5.3.2.1 Case 1: Only normal data 
Let us consider a SVDD problem with only normal training data which has N samples. 
When s is one of support vectors on the boundary, 2R , boundary radius square, is 
represented as follows from equation (4.3) and (4.6); 
 





























where ix and jα are normal data and its Lagrange multiplier. Since there are small 
differences among 2R values based different support vectors, average of 2R over all 
support vectors is proper as criterion function for the size of boundary. Let ( )psR 2 be 
boundary radius square based on the support vector ps . Now, J , criterion function, is 














where SV is a set of support vectors and there are t support vectors. A kernel function 
( )jiK xx ⋅ can be introduced into the criterion function. By introducing kernel function 
instead of inner product, the criterion function can be expressed as: 
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21 xxx ααα (5.3) 
 
where SV is a set of support vectors and there are t support vectors. The table 5.1 shows 
criterion functions for SVDD-R2-RFE feature selection method modified by introducing 
kernel functions. 
Let )( kJ − be value of the criterion function for the boundary trained without feature k .
The effect to remove feature k in the criterion function is calculated by the equation 
)()( kJJkDJ −−= . The worst feature is *k minimizing )(kDJ over all feature k s. 
 
Table 5.1 SVDD-R2-RFE criterion functions with only normal data for kernel functions 
Kernel type SVDD-R2-RFE criterion functions 
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5.3.2.2 Case 2: Normal and anomaly data 
Let us consider a SVDD problem with N samples of normal and M samples of anomalies 
in training data. 2R based on ps being one of support vectors on the boundary is 
represented as follows from equation (4.11) and (4.22); 
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kx , iα and 
*
kα are normal data, anomaly and their Lagrange multipliers. The 
criterion function combined with a kernel function ( )jiK xx ⋅ is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
































































where SV is a set of support vectors and there are t support vectors. The table 5.2 shows 
criterion functions of SVDD-R2-RFE feature selection method for kernel functions. The 




Table 5.2 SVDD-R2-RFE criterion functions with anomaly data for kernel functions 
 
Kernel type SVDD-R2-RFE criterion functions 
Linear 
( ) ( ) ( )
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5.3.3 Algorithm of SVDD-R2-RFE feature selection 
(a) Initialize:
(a.1) Train SVDD with a given training data, [ ]TmktrnX xxx LL ,,1= under          
 selected kernel function.  
(a.2) Initialize subset of surviving features, [ ]nL,2,1=s , and feature ranking list,  
 [ ]=r
(b) Repeat until [ ]=s :
(b.1) Construct newly reduced training data 
[ ]s:,trnreduced XX = .
(b.2) Train SVDD with reducedX to get s'α
(b.3) Compute the criterion function for each feature k in table 5.1 and 5.2 
)()( kJJkDJ −−=




(b.5) Update feature ranking list 
[ ]rsr ),(i=
(b.6) Eliminate feature i in the subset of surviving features 
{ }(i)s-ss =
(c) Output: feature ranking list, r
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5.4 SVDD-RFE Feature Selection Method 
5.4.1 Idea 
SVDD is to try to find as a small boundary as possible that envelops most of normal data. 
The solution of the SVDD problem is given as the form of Lagrange multipliers which 
are a solution to the dual problem of SVDD. SVDD boundary can be obtained from the 
Lagrange multipliers and their corresponding observations. The dual problem is to find 
Lagrange multipliers that maximize its objective function value as seen in equation 
(4.31). Let J and )( kJ − be a value of the objective function in the dual problem of 
SVDD and a recalculated value of the objective function without the feature k . The 
difference between J and )( kJ − becomes larger when feature k is less important and 
smaller when it is a better feature than others. The proposed idea on criterion function to 
evaluate the worth of each feature is that the worst feature is a feature with the smallest 
value of )( kJ − among all features. Let )(kDJ be the difference between J and )( kJ −
such as )()( kJJkDJ −−= . Therefore, the worst feature is *k feature satisfying the 




Also, Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) is used as the searching method for the 




5.4.2.1 Case 1: Only normal data 
The objective function in the dual of a SVDD problem with only normal training data 
was given in equation (4.8). In order to measure the effect in the value of J resulted from 
removing a feature in the training data set, we need to train a SVDD boundary for every 
candidate feature to be excluded. This means that effort to train a boundary for each 
feature monotonically increases as the number of feature rises, thus forcing this process 
being impractical. Based on the fact that Lagrange multiplier α corresponds with each 
observation and does not related with features, we can assume that there are no changes 
in the values of s'α when only one feature is eliminated in the training data set. We can 
easily compute the effect of removing a feature without retraining boundaries by this 
assumption. The following )( kJ − is the value of the objective function in the dual 
without feature k :












)()()()()()()()( xxxx ααα (5.7) 
 
where )( k− means that the component k has been removed. Now, the effect to remove 
feature k is calculated by the following criterion function: 
 
)()( kJJkDJ −−= (5.8) 
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By introducing general kernel function, ),( jiK xx , in the objective function, J is 
changed as follows: 












xxxx ααα (5.9) 
The objective functions for linear, Gaussian and polynomial kernel are in table 5.3. 
5.4.2.2 Case 2: Normal and anomaly data 
The objective function in the dual of SVDD problem with training data set including L
samples of normal data and M of attack was given from Tax and Duin (2004) as the 
following: 
( ) ( ) ( )








































Table 5.3 SVDD-RFE criterion functions with only normal data for kernel functions 
Kernel type SVDD-RFE criterion functions 

























































jx , iα and 
*
jα are normal data, anomaly and their Lagrange multipliers. In 
this case, )( kJ − is as follows: 
 






























































The effect to remove feature k is calculated by the same way in Section 5.4.2.1. By 
introducing general kernel function, ),( jiK xx J is changed as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )










































Table 5.4 shows objective functions for linear, Gaussian and polynomial kernels.  
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Table 5.4 SVDD-RFE criterion functions with anomaly data for kernel functions 
 
Kernel type SVDD-RFE criterion functions 
Linear 
( ) ( ) ( )
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5.4.3 Algorithm of SVDD-RFE feature selection 
(a) Initialize:
(a.1) Train SVDD with a given training data, [ ]TmktrnX xxx LL ,,1= under          
 selected kernel function.  
(a.2) Initialize subset of surviving features, [ ]nL,2,1=s , and feature ranking list,  
 [ ]=r
(b) Repeat until [ ]=s :
(b.1) Construct newly reduced training data 
[ ]s:,trnreduced XX = .
(b.2) Train SVDD with reducedX to get s'α
(b.3) Compute the criterion function for each feature k
)()( kJJkDJ −−=




(b.5) Update feature ranking list 
[ ]rsr ),(i=
(b.6) Eliminate feature i in the subset of surviving features 
{ }(i)s-ss =
(c) Output: feature ranking list, r
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5.5 SVDD-Gradient Feature Selection Method 
5.5.1 Ideas 
The SVDD decision function to decide whether a test sample z is normal or outlier can be 











22 µµ (5.13) 
Figure 5.2 shows the value of decision function (5.13) in the case of two features. The 
value of decision function is one when a test sample is inside or on the SVDD boundary 
and zero when a sample is outside the boundary. 
The gradient of a scalar function is a vector which points the direction of the greatest rate 
of increase of the function, and whose magnitude is the greatest rate of change according 
to Wikipedia encyclopedia (2006). Figure 5.3 shows the gradient applied into the SVDD 
decision function with two features. The small arrows represent the gradient for only the 
points near-outside and on the boundary while the other points have zero magnitude of 
gradient. It is obvious in figure 5.4 that feature B is the better feature compared to feature 
A since feature B has smaller region than feature A. As we divide all gradients into 
feature A axis and B axis components and sum absolute values of the components for 
each axis, feature B has very larger value than feature A. We can draw a clue for feature 
selection that a feature is important to the SVDD classification if its sum of all the 
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Figure 5.2 Value distribution of SVDD decision function in two-feature case 
 
Figure 5.3 Gradient field of decision function in two-feature case 
 













Figure 5.4 Gradient field of decision function at ellipse shape boundary 
 
absolute values of gradient components is bigger. In SVDD the boundary is based on the 
support vectors which are objects on the boundary. It is reasonable that gradient is 
calculated for support vectors. Our feature selection is performed by computing axis 
component of gradient on each support vector, summing all absolute values of its 
components for each feature, and sorting them in descending order. The order is 
preference ranking for all features.  
5.5.2 Formulation 
5.5.2.1 Case 1: Only normal data 
The equation of SVDD decision boundary for a test sample z can be written from 








22)( µ−−= zRzg (5.14) 
 
The equation of SVDD (5.14) is as follows by inserting the equation (4.6) for center µ
and (5.1) for radius:  
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By introducing kernel function ),( jiK xx , equation (5.15) is as follows: 
 










22)( xx αα (5.16) 
 
Calculation of gradient for kernel functions was known by Hermes and Buhmann (2000). 













22)()( xα (5.17) 
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For polynomial kernel with degree d , the SVDD boundary equation is: 
 













22)( xx αα (5.20) 
 
The gradient of equation (5.20) with respect to z is: 
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Let ( )iSVg∇ be the gradient computed at the ith support vector among l support vectors. 
Since the gradient is a vector with n dimension which is the number of features in the 
training data, ( )iSVg∇ can be represented with its components as in the following 
equation: 
 
( ) ninjijiii ggggSVg eeee LL +++=∇ 2211 (5.22) 
 
Criterion function for jth feature is the summation of absolute value of jth component 
over gradients of all support vectors. The following equation is for the criterion function 






ijj gJ (5.23) 
where SV is a set of support vectors. 
5.5.2.2 Case 2: Normal and anomaly data 
The equation for µ can be represented in equation (5.24) when normal data ix and attack 














xxµ αα (5.24) 
 
The equation of SVDD decision boundary for a test sample z can be written as follows by 
inserting the equation (5.24) for center µ and (5.4) for radius:  
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Equation (5.25) can be rewritten as follows by introducing kernel function ),( jiK xx :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




















































222)()( xx αα (5.27) 
 













































































































The gradient of equation (5.28) with respect to z is: 
 






































































































The SVDD boundary equation for polynomial kernel with degree d , is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






































The gradient of equation (5.30) with respect to z is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )





















































The criterion function for jth feature is the same in equation (5.23) 
 
5.5.3 Algorithm of SVDD-Gradient feature selection 
 (a) Initialize feature ranking list 
 [ ]=r .
(b) Train SVDD with a given training data under selected kernel function. 
(c) Compute the gradient for each support vectors. Refer to the table 5.5 for  
gradients of kernel functions. 
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1J in descending order of the first row 
(f) Output: feature ranking list 
( )[ ]:,_Jr 2sorted=
5.6 Experiments 
5.6.1 Experimental setup 
Two datasets were used for the experiment of the proposed SVDD-based feature 
selection methods. One is based on the DARPA dataset which was used in the previous 
chapters. We normalized the dataset to reduce variance effect due to range difference 
among its features. The other dataset was artificially generated to make it clear which 
feature is better or worse. It is called simulated dataset. We made up normal and anomaly 
samples in a 20-dimensional data space for the experiment. The center of the normal 
samples was located at ( )T,, 00 L , and anomaly samples were based on one of four centers 
being located at ( )T,, 11L , ( )T,, 11 −− L , ( )T,, 1,1,11 −− L and ( )T,, 1,11,1 −− L . Each feature 
of all the samples was independently corrupted by Gaussian noise with zero mean and 
standard deviations dependent on the feature index i as 12.12.0 −× i (Hermes & Buhmann, 
2000). Table 5.6 shows the Gaussian noise’s mean and sigma charged to the 20 features. 
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Table 5.6 Gaussian noises for features 
 
Feature number Noise Feature number Noise 
1 ( )22.0,0N 11 ( )224.1,0N
2 ( )224.0,0N 12 ( )249.1,0N
3 ( )229.0,0N 13 ( )278.1,0N
4 ( )235.0,0N 14 ( )214.2,0N
5 ( )241.0,0N 15 ( )257.2,0N
6 ( )25.0,0N 16 ( )208.3,0N
7 ( )26.0,0N 17 ( )27.3,0N
8 ( )272.0,0N 18 ( )244.4,0N
9 ( )286.0,0N 19 ( )232.5,0N
10 ( )203.1,0N 20 ( )239.6,0N
By increasing noises along with feature index, the first feature is the most favorable and 
the last becomes the most confusing feature to distinguish anomalies from normal data. 
Figure 5.5 shows the trend for normal and anomaly data to approach closely as the 
feature indices increase. Normal data and anomalies are clearly away from each other in 
the space with feature 1 and 2 as seen in figure 5.5(a). However, anomalies locate in the 
middle of normal data in the figure 5.5 (d), thereby being difficult to distinguish them 
from normal. 
The performances of the proposed three SVDD feature selection methods were compared 
with the performance of SVM-RFE feature selection method that is regarded as one of 
the most effective feature selection method in classification problems. The comparison 
was performed in two cases dependent on available data: case 1 is when only normal data 
is available in training data and case 2 is the situation that normal and anomaly data are 
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(a) Feature 1 & 2                                           (b) Feature 5 & 6 
 
(c) Feature 13 & 14                                          (d) Feature 19 & 20 
 
Figure 5.5  Two-dimensional pictures to show distribution of normal data represented 
with dot and anomaly with plus sign in various feature combinations. 
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available. In the case 1, only proposed SVDD-based feature selection methods were 
evaluated with the simulated data since SVM-RFE feature selection method does not 
work. The DARPA data was not used in the case 1. Since what feature is better or worse 
is clear in the simulated dataset, the performance of the method in the case 1 was tested 
by checking whether SVDD-RFE results agree with the designed feature ranking in the 
dataset. To avoid bias due to randomness of simulated data, 100 data sets were used and 
the average performances were used. In the case 2, three SVDD-based methods and the 
SVM method were compared for the simulated data set in two ways. The first way is 
similar with one in the case 1 that inspects correctness of the selected feature order based 
on the 100 data sets. The second way is to measure the performance of selected features 
by applying detection method to the feature. For the DARPA data in case 2, only SVDD-
RFE method was compared with the SVM-RFE method because the DARPA data is 
heavy and takes long time to run feature selection methods. The performance of feature 
selection methods in the case 2 was measured by false alarm rate and detection rate. In 
addition, Gaussian kernel function was used in all the experiment since the kernel is 
recognized as the best in most of classification cases. Table 5.7 shows the summary of 
this experimental setup.  
5.6.2 Results on Case 1 
Table 5.8 shows results to compare performances of the proposed SVDD-based feature 
selection methods and SVM-RFE feature selection method with simulated data in the 
case 1. The best performance achieved by both of the SVDD-R2-RFE and the SVDD- 
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Table 5.7 Summary of experimental setup and performance measure 
 
Available data situation Case 1 Case 2 
Data set Simulated data Simulated data DARPA data 
Proposed 
methods 
False alarm rate 
& detection rate 
by applying 
SVDD to feature 
order output 
False alarm rate 












order False alarm rate & detection rate 
by applying 
SVDD and SVM 
to feature order 
output 
False alarm rate 
& detection rate 
by applying 
SVDD and 
SVM to feature 
order output 
RFE feature selection methods showing 100% correctness that right order of 20 features 
was identified perfectly without any wrong selection. The second best performance was 
carried out by the SVDD-Gradient individual ranking method that identified correctly 
best 15 out of 20 features. However, it was impossible for the SVM-RFE method to 
perform feature selection for the data set with only normal data. Only the proposed 
SVDD-based feature selection methods are able to perform feature selection for the data 
set like case 1 where anomaly data is not available in training data set. 
5.6.3 Results on Case 2 
Table 5.9 shows feature orders selected by the proposed SVDD-based feature selection 
methods and SVM-RFE with simulated data in the case 2. The best performance achieved 
by both of the SVDD-R2-RFE and the SVDD-RFE feature selection methods showing  
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Table 5.8 Feature order selected by the proposed SVDD-based feature selection methods 
and SVM-RFE with simulated data in the case 1 
SVDD-based feature selection method Best feature 
order R2-RFE SVDD-RFE Gradient 
SVM-RFE 
1 Feature 1 Feature 1 Feature 1 N/A 
2 Feature 2 Feature 2 Feature 2 N/A 
3 Feature 3 Feature 3 Feature 3 N/A 
4 Feature 4 Feature 4 Feature 4 N/A 
5 Feature 5 Feature 5 Feature 5 N/A 
6 Feature 6 Feature 6 Feature 6 N/A 
7 Feature 7 Feature 7 Feature 7 N/A 
8 Feature 8 Feature 8 Feature 8 N/A 
9 Feature 9 Feature 9 Feature 9 N/A 
10 Feature 10 Feature 10 Feature 10 N/A 
11 Feature 11 Feature 11 Feature 11 N/A 
12 Feature 12 Feature 12 Feature 12 N/A 
13 Feature 13 Feature 13 Feature 13 N/A 
14 Feature 14 Feature 14 Feature 14 N/A 
15 Feature 15 Feature 15 Feature 15 N/A 
16 Feature 16 Feature 16 Feature 17 N/A 
17 Feature 17 Feature 17 Feature 18 N/A 
18 Feature 18 Feature 18 Feature 20 N/A 
19 Feature 19 Feature 19 Feature 19 N/A 
20 Feature 20 Feature 20 Feature 16 N/A 
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100% correctness that right order of 20 features was identified perfectly without any 
wrong selection. The second best performance was carried out by the SVDD-Gradient 
individual ranking method that identified correctly 16 out of 20 features. The SVM-RFE 
method showed the worst performance to feature selection for the simulated data set, in 
which identified correctly only 10 out of 20 features.  
Table 5.10 shows performance results in comparison of the proposed SVDD-based 
feature selection methods and SVM-RFE with simulated data in the case 2. The best 
subsets of features with best performance in terms of false alarm rate and detection rate 
are 4-feature set with 100% detection rate and 7.1% false alarm rate from the SVDD-
Gradient, 2-feature set with 100% and 6.9% from the SVDD-R2-RFE, 2-feature set with 
100% and 6.9% from the SVDD-RFE, one-feature set with 87% and 0.2% from the 
SVM-RFE with SVM detection, and 4-feature set with 100% and 7% from the SVM-RFE 
with SVDD detection. The best performance came from the 2-feature subsets of both the 
SVDD-R2-RFE and the SVDD-RFE. The second was the performance of 4-feature 
subset obtained by both of the SVDD-Gradient and the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection. 
Considering the entire performances for all the best feature subset, both of the SVDD-R2-
RFE and he SVDD-RFE are slightly better to anomaly feature selection than the SVDD-
Gradient and the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection. The SVM-RFE with SVM detection 
showed the worst performance in all selected feature subsets. Therefore, the proposed 
SVDD-based feature selection methods are better than or equal performance with the 




Table 5.9 Feature order selected by the proposed SVDD-based feature selection methods 
and SVM-RFE with simulated data in the case 2 
SVDD-based feature selection method Best feature 
order R2-RFE SVDD-RFE Gradient 
SVM-RFE 
1 Feature 1 Feature 1 Feature 1 Feature 2 
2 Feature 2 Feature 2 Feature 2 Feature 1 
3 Feature 3 Feature 3 Feature 3 Feature 5 
4 Feature 4 Feature 4 Feature 4 Feature 3 
5 Feature 5 Feature 5 Feature 5 Feature 4 
6 Feature 6 Feature 6 Feature 6 Feature 7 
7 Feature 7 Feature 7 Feature 8 Feature 10 
8 Feature 8 Feature 8 Feature 7 Feature 8 
9 Feature 9 Feature 9 Feature 9 Feature 9 
10 Feature 10 Feature 10 Feature 10 Feature 6 
11 Feature 11 Feature 11 Feature 11 Feature 11 
12 Feature 12 Feature 12 Feature 13 Feature 12 
13 Feature 13 Feature 13 Feature 12 Feature 13 
14 Feature 14 Feature 14 Feature 14 Feature 14 
15 Feature 15 Feature 15 Feature 15 Feature 15 
16 Feature 16 Feature 16 Feature 16 Feature 16 
17 Feature 17 Feature 17 Feature 17 Feature 17 
18 Feature 18 Feature 18 Feature 18 Feature 18 
19 Feature 19 Feature 19 Feature 19 Feature 19 
20 Feature 20 Feature 20 Feature 20 Feature 20 
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Individual ranking RFE RFE RFE
Detection method SVDD SVDD SVDD SVM SVDD
Performance measure FA* DR** FA* DR** FA* DR** FA* DR** FA* DR**
All features 99.6% 100% 99.1% 100% 99.1% 100% 0.3% 0% 99.1% 100%
19 97.8% 100% 93.9% 100% 89.2% 100% 0.2% 0% 89.2% 100%
18 87.2% 100% 72.4% 98% 72.4% 98% 0.3% 1% 72.4% 98%
17 81.3% 100% 55.4% 97% 55.4% 97% 0.2% 6% 58.7% 98%
16 75.9% 100% 36.7% 94% 36.7% 94% 0.1% 7% 36.7% 94%
15 57.0% 99% 24.8% 89% 24.8% 89% 0.0% 7% 33.0% 97%
14 41.6% 99% 23.5% 96% 18.6% 92% 0.0% 6% 23.5% 96%
13 32.1% 99% 17.6% 95% 12.4% 91% 0.0% 11% 14.5% 92%
12 32.4% 100% 12.4% 96% 7.9% 95% 0.0% 15% 7.9% 95%
11 36.7% 100% 8.5% 96% 8.5% 96% 0.0% 19% 10.2% 96%
10 9.3% 99% 9.1% 98% 9.1% 98% 0.0% 26% 9.1% 98%
9 7.9% 100% 7.6% 100% 9.3% 100% 0.0% 23% 9.4% 100%
8 11.7% 100% 12.1% 100% 11.6% 100% 0.0% 34% 12.1% 100%
7 10.5% 100% 10.5% 100% 10.5% 100% 0.0% 33% 11.8% 100%
6 7.7% 100% 9.2% 100% 10.2% 100% 0.0% 34% 7.6% 100%
5 11.0% 100% 7.6% 100% 10.8% 100% 0.0% 51% 10.9% 100%
4 7.1% 100% 9.5% 100% 9.5% 100% 0.0% 52% 7.0% 100%
3 7.9% 100% 10.3% 100% 10.3% 100% 0.0% 79% 7.8% 100%




1 10.5% 100% 10.5% 100% 10.5% 100% 0.2% 87% 10.5% 100%
* FA: false alarm rate for normal data
** DR: detection rate for anomaly data
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Table 5.11 shows the comparison results of the proposed SVDD-RFE feature selection 
method and SVM-RFE with the DARPA data in the case 2. The best subsets of features 
are 6-feature set with 100% detection rate and 1.6% false alarm rate from the SVDD-
RFE, 14-feature set with 90.1% and 0.04% from the SVM-RFE with SVM detection, and 
99-feature set with 100% and 2.2% from the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection. The 6-
feature subset of the SVDD-RFE is the best than the other two methods’ in terms of 
number of feature and performance results. The performances of three methods with all 
the features are 100% detection rate and 5.7% false alarm rate from the SVDD-RFE and 
the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection, and 90.7% and 1.1% from the SVM-RFE with 
SVM detection. Both of the SVDD-RFE and the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection 
achieved same performance because they use same detection technique, SVDD, for the 
same data set. They performed better with all the features than the SVM-RFE with SVM 
detection method. As comparing the performances of three methods along with various 
feature subsets, only the SVDD-RFE method achieved reasonable performance until 10 
feature subsets. For example, the method showed 95.6% detection rate with 1% false 
alarm rate from single feature subset and 100% with 4.7% from 10 feature subset. 
However, the SVM-RFE with SVM detection and the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection 
methods showed 0% and 9.3% detection rate, respectively, in both single and 10 feature 
subsets. After 40 feature subset, the SVDD-RFE method showed as good performance as 
the other two methods’. It is clear that the SVDD-RFE method performed much better 
than SVM-RFE with SVM detection and the SVM-RFE with SVDD detection methods. 
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Table 5.11 Comparison results of the proposed SVDD-RFE feature selection method and 





Detection method SVDD SVM SVDD 
Performance measure FA* DR** FA* DR** FA* DR** 
All features 5.7% 100% 1.1% 90.7% 5.7% 100% 
Best performance 













200 5.4% 100% 0.7% 90.7% 5.3% 100% 
160 5.3% 100% 0.6% 90.7% 4.5% 100% 
120 5.0% 100% 0.5% 90.7% 4.0% 100% 
80 5.4% 100% 0.4% 90.7% 10.1% 100% 
40 3.2% 100% 0.1% 90.1% 2.8% 9.9% 




1 1.0% 95.6% 0% 0% 0.1% 9.3% 
* FA: false alarm rate for normal data 
** DR: detection rate for anomaly data 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Research 
 
This chapter provides conclusion of this dissertation in Section 6.1 and presents future 
research area in Section 6.2. 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
The proposed differentiated anomaly intrusion detection method was effective according 
to the experimental results. The differentiated detection was motivated by the fact that 
there exists more critical type of intrusions against information systems. The system 
administrator needs to focus on detecting as precisely intrusions of the type as possible 
even compromising with false alarms and detection of non-target attack types. With the 
simulated data experiment, our differentiated detection method demonstrated that it had 
enough potential to fit well with those practical needs. It was noticeable that using more 
training samples of target attack type can provide more detailed performance of the 
differentiated intrusion detection. Another experiment with the preprocessed DARPA 
BSM data confirmed our method’s usefulness in the real situation. Since the concept of 
differentiated anomaly detection can be applicable into other anomaly detection areas, 
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this method would be beneficial to broader application areas beyond intrusion detection 
field. 
The new framework for host-based feature extraction showed promising results from the 
experiment with features which were extracted from DARPA_MITLL 98 BSM data set 
by the framework. This new framework was studied to widen feature searching space and 
explore further searching directions for better features. Based on new viewpoints about 
user activities, the framework brought new feature categories such as length, intensity, 
and event type. According to the experiment with SVDD classifiers, event type category 
was the most effective single category among three, and each category of length and 
intensity was not practical. This result supports why most existing researches have used 
event type features. However, another significant finding was that combination of length 
and intensity features could be powerful features. This suggests importance of two 
feature categories and requires further investigation of features combined with the two 
categories. In addition, all features combined from three categories showed better 
performance than existing features. Therefore, the proposed new framework is worthy 
enough to be regarded as an efficient approach for host-based feature development. 
In this dissertation, SVDD-based feature selection methods such as SVDD-R2-RFE, 
SVDD-RFE and SVDD-Gradient have been presented to provide feature selection tools 
for anomaly detection field. The proposed feature selection methods were compared with 
well-known SVM-RFE feature selection method using simulated data and the DARPA 
data set. The results showed that the proposed methods performed much better than 
SVM-RFE for both datasets. Only the proposed methods were able to perform feature 
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selection for training data without anomalies whereas the SVM-RFE was not able to do. 
With the DARPA data, the proposed SVDD-RFE method showed better performance 
than the SVM-RFE. In comparison of the proposed methods, SVDD-R2-RFE and 
SVDD-RFE were better in feature selection than SVDD-Gradient. 
 
6.2 Future Research 
Future research is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed differentiated 
detection and SVDD-based feature selection methods by applying them to other 
applications in anomaly detection area. The possible application fields are product quality 
inspection, nuclear power plant control management, and medical examination in which 
there are huge normal outputs and very few anomalies. 
Another future work is to explore the effectiveness of the differentiated anomaly 
detection combined with SVDD-based feature selection method. The idea is to make the 
differentiated detection more powerful by using the feature selection method in finding 
more predictive features to distinguish a target attack type from non-target attacks.  
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